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ABSTRACT
The literature on human rights generally assumes that when a state fails to comply with
human rights norms, it is because the state's leaders rationally determined that a violation
would maximize the state's expected utility. Strategies for improving compliance accordingly
focus on altering a state's expected utility calculation either through coercion, which seeks to
introduce external incentives that make compliance more attractive, or persuasion, which
seeks to recalibrate a state's underlying preferences. A wide array of social science research,
however, has demonstrated that human beings regularly make suboptimal decisions that
fail to maximize their expected utility. This so-called behavioral research has had a signifi-
cant impact on domestic law scholarship, but its implications for human rights, as well as
for international law more broadly, have not yet been adequately explored.
This Article begins that long-overdue conversation by showing that states may in some
instances have an interest in complying with human rights norms but fail to do so as the
result of suboptimal decision-making by their leaders. In particular, this Article explores
how three strands of social science research-on prospect theory, overconfidence, and emo-
tion-based decision-making have been applied to state leaders in international relations
scholarship and can be extended to help explain suboptimal decisions in the human rights
context. In doing so, this Article also addresses (without attempting to conclusively resolve)
some of the major methodological objections to such a project by collecting the most recent
available research on the extent to which experimental findings about individuals in labora-
tories can be translated into predictions about state behavior. Two more detailed examples
are then provided to illustrate how suboptimal decision-making may have contributed to
human rights violations in real-world scenarios. Finally, this Article identifies several steps
the human rights community can take, beyond coercion and persuasion, to capitalize on
existing incentive structures and find ways to ensure that states that already have an inter-
est in complying actually do so.
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INTRODUCTION
Country A has a long tradition of respecting and promoting hu-
man rights. A recent spate of terrorist attacks, however, has created
unease among the citizenry about national security concerns. In re-
sponse to these concerns, the government enacts a series of measures
that enhance its power to prosecute suspected terrorists and their
allies at the expense of civil liberties. Human rights nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) and other members of the international
community criticize these measures as an unacceptable infringement
upon individual rights of speech and association.
Country B has no tradition of valuing human rights. Its current
leaders, however, have signed and ratified a number of international
conventions because doing so enhances the country's reputation
among potential trading partners and providers of aid. The ruling
party in country B has a longstanding conflict with an ethnic minori-
ty group, which has recently escalated into violent skirmishes be-
tween rebels and state security forces. As a result, the government
begins arresting and detaining members of the minority group with-
out evidence and authorizes its security troops to use forceful meth-
ods to quell protests.
With only the limited information provided above, both of these
scenarios can be readily explained in terms of a rational actor model,
meaning that the leaders of both A and B could have made decisions
that maximized the expected utilities of their respective countries.
Although the leaders of country A may have a general preference for
respecting human rights, they could have made a rational calculation
that security interests outweighed that preference at a particular
moment in time. Likewise, although the leaders of country B may see
human rights compliance as desirable from an instrumental perspec-
tive, they could have made a rational determination that the course
of action they adopted would have more benefits in their domestic
conflict than any accompanying costs to the country's international
reputation.
Importantly, however, both of these scenarios could also have in-
volved suboptimal decision-making, meaning that the leaders of A
and B actually failed to maximize the expected utilities of their re-
spective countries. In the case of country A, it could be that a differ-
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ent balancing of liberty and security would have adequately protected
civil and political rights without substantially sacrificing national
security objectives. Likewise, in the case of country B, it could be that
the reputational benefits to be gained from a more conciliatory ap-
proach to the domestic conflict would have outweighed the strategic
benefits gained from a retaliatory approach. In short, for both coun-
tries compliance with human rights could have been the optimal
course from the standpoint of maximizing utility.
The goal of this Article is to bring attention to the possibility of
suboptimal decision-making in the human rights context and to begin
a conversation about what can and should be done about it. Much of
human rights scholarship and practice is still premised on the as-
sumption that violations result from utility-maximizing behavior.
This limited perspective is apparent in the assumptions behind the
two leading strategies for influencing human rights compliance: coer-
cion and persuasion.1 Both types of strategies seek to improve com-
pliance by altering a state's expected utility calculation. Coercion
strategies attempt to introduce additional material incentives into
that calculation designed either to make compliance more beneficial
or violation more costly.2 Country A could thus be coerced into com-
plying with international norms on speech and association rights if
the new incentives meant that compliance would now yield the most
net benefits. Persuasion strategies, on the other hand, attempt to re-
calibrate the existing components in a state's expected utility calcula-
tion by reshaping the state's underlying preferences to give greater
weight to human rights concerns.3 Country B could thus be persuad-
ed to comply with international norms on arrest and detention if the
international community could convince B's leaders of the importance
and validity of these norms.
What is overlooked by coercion and persuasion strategies is the
possibility of improving compliance within a state's existing incentive
structure. It is undoubtedly true that many human rights violations
result from utility-maximizing behavior, and for those violations the
only options for improving compliance would be to alter the state's
incentives and change its underlying preferences. As I hope to
demonstrate, however, it is likely that at least a subset of human
1. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Ifluence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 633-38 (2004) (describing these two
mechanisms of social influence). Goodman and Jinks describe a third mechanism of social
influence, acculturation, by which behavioral changes are induced "through pressures to
assimilate." Id. at 638. For purposes of this Article, I set acculturation aside because it
overlaps sufficiently with the other two mechanisms at least in the aspects with which the
present discussion is concerned.
2. Id. at 633-34.
3. Id. at 635-38.
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rights violations result from what would properly be deemed subop-
timal decision-making. That is, at least some human rights violations
are committed because a state's leaders fail to recognize that compli-
ance would actually be optimal in light of the state's existing incen-
tives and preferences. And if that is correct, then other measures,
beyond coercion and persuasion, may be needed to address such
abuses. In short, there may be opportunities for the human rights
community to improve compliance by ensuring that states that al-
ready have an interest in complying actually do so.
Social science research in disciplines like behavioral economics
and cognitive psychology has shown that real, live human beings
regularly fail to make decisions consistent with what a rational actor
model would predict.4 A rational actor model assumes that individu-
als make decisions by consciously calculating the expected utility of
competing choices and opting for the course that maximizes their
utility. Empirical studies of people observed in both laboratory and
real-world settings, however, suggest that individuals depart from
this model in a number of ways. To take just one example that will be
explored further below, people have a tendency to treat prospective
losses and gains asymmetrically in their decision-making process.
Although a rational actor model predicts that individuals would in-
vest equally to avoid a ten-dollar loss and to acquire a ten-dollar
gain, in fact they tend to be more motivated by the prospect of the
former than that of the latter.5
The existence of such obstacles to complete rationality is uncon-
troversial, and outside of international law this so-called behavioral
research has had a significant influence on legal scholars already.
Some critics may dispute the extent or prevalence of particular bias-
es, 6 or contend that they are of limited value to policymaking,7 but
the basic point that humans sometimes make suboptimal decisions is
4. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051 (2000) (describing the social science research and various potential applications to
legal theory).
5. See infra Part I.B.1.
6. See, e.g., Richard A Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1570 (1998) (questioning the "empirical robustness of behavioral
economics").
7. These objections take a variety of forms. One is that the evidence is incomplete or
otherwise inconclusive. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO.
L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002). Another is that the research does not provide a sufficiently systemat-
ic understanding of human behavior to guide policynaking. See id. at 71-72. A third is
that, even assuming suboptimality could be systematically understood, there may be unin-
tended consequences of paternalistic governmental intervention. See Jonathan
Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1622-23 (2006).
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now widely accepted.8 The question, then, is whether and how this
research can inform efforts to promote human rights compliance.
This Article aims to spark that conversation.9
There are reasons for caution. Apart from the objections that
scholars have made to the broader behavioralist project, a further
reason that this research has not yet been adapted to the human
rights context specifically is the uncertainty regarding how individu-
al-level biases mostly observed in laboratories can be applied to ana-
lyze the real-world behavior of leaders acting on behalf of states. Re-
cent work by international relations scholars, however, has seen at
least some progress in attempting to make that translation. Thus,
apart from the particular insights this discussion may have for hu-
man rights policy and practice, a further contribution I hope to make
here is to collect recent research from the international relations lit-
erature on suboptimal decision-making by state leaders and begin a
broader conversation about its implications for international law in
general. 10
Part I begins by describing the existing human rights regime, in-
cluding the major strategies for improving compliance and the extent
to which they have succeeded. Part II then explains the concept of
suboptimal state decision-making and identifies three lines of social
science research that I believe are most likely to have useful implica-
8. See Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consum-
er Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 471-72 (2007) ('Alt-
hough some scholars have challenged this empirical literature, they have not generally
denied the existence of cognitive biases, or the possibility that behavioral models might
have greater predictive power than neoclassical models under some conditions." (citation
omitted)).
9. Legal scholars have applied other aspects of the behavioral literature to human
rights concerns. Andrew Woods, for example, has explored how human rights regimes
might be adapted to go beyond their present focus on influencing unitary actors and take
account of new research on how broader contextual factors shape social change. See An-
drew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 51, 53
(2010). A recent volume edited by Woods, Ryan Goodman, and Derek Jinks collects inter-
disciplinary essays by researchers in psychology, economics, and political science to consid-
er issues such as how human rights change interacts with the development of social norms
and how the phenomenon of psychic numbing may pose an obstacle to effective interven-
tion against genocide. See Deborah A. Prentice, The Psychology of Social Norms and the
Promotion of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS 23, 23-46 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012); Paul Slovic
& David Zionts, Can International Law Stop Genocide When Our Moral Intuitions Fail Us?,
in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HuMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 100-34.
10. Two recent works have undertaken a similar project, though they survey interna-
tional law generally rather than focusing on human rights. See generally Anne van Aaken,
Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (2014) (applying the
behavioral law and economics approach to questions of treaty design and international law
compliance); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-2320375 (applying
behavioral insights to problems in international treaty-making, the structure of interna-
tional tribunals, and target selection in armed conflict).
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tions for human rights. The first is prospect theory, and in particular
its prediction that human beings are more motivated to avoid losses
than to obtain gains. The second is overconfidence, namely the phe-
nomenon that human beings make overly optimistic assessments of
their abilities and prospects for success. And the third is the role of
emotions in decision-making, and in particular the idea that human
beings view situations through the lens of particular patterns that
were formed during emotionally resonant past experiences. For each
cause of suboptimal decision-making, I focus on how the concept has
been applied to state leaders in international relations scholarship
before discussing how similar patterns may illuminate decision-
making in the human rights context specifically.
In Part III, I discuss two examples in further depth to illustrate
how the various forms of suboptimal decision-making discussed in
Part II may have contributed to human rights violations by the Unit-
ed States in the events at Abu Ghraib and by Turkey in its treatment
of its Kurdish population. Finally, Part IV proposes some ways in
which the human rights community could make immediate gains in
improving compliance, without having to alter a state's incentives or
preferences, by adopting strategies specifically designed to address
the causes of suboptimal decision-making.
In highlighting the problem of suboptimal decision-making for
human rights, this Article ultimately seeks to supplement rather
than displace existing reform agendas. As noted above, I would not
dispute that many human rights violations are the result of rational
decision-making, and to prevent such violations it is essential to find
ways to strengthen material incentives for compliance as well as to
change the hearts and minds of state leaders who place little value
on human rights concerns. But I believe developing strategies to
counter suboptimal decision-making is an equally important and
complementary task.11 It is equally important because at least some
conceivable measures to address the causes of suboptimal decision-
making are more realistically achievable and immediately attainable.
Coercion strategies often fail because they require substantial re-
sources and political will to succeed, 12 while persuasion strategies are
necessarily gradual and will take a significant period of time.13 While
the efforts on those two fronts are ongoing, the human rights com-
munity could achieve some more immediate progress by targeting
suboptimality barriers specifically. Addressing suboptimality is also
11. I made two similar points in an earlier project that applied behavioral research to
analyze corporate human rights violations. See Note, Organizational Irrationality and
Corporate Human Rights Violations, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2009).
12. See Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, 6
L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 148, 157-60 (2012).
13. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 64 (2013).
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generally a complementary strategy because even when coercion and
persuasion strategies have succeeded in making compliance the utili-
ty-maximizing option, the state's leaders could still go awry and opt
for noncompliance as the result of suboptimal decision-making.
In sum, suboptimal decision-making is likely to be an important
issue for the human rights project in the short and long term, so
while empirical work on the nature and scope of the problem re-
mains to be done, the conversation about its implications should not
be delayed.
I. THE EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
This Part provides a brief overview of the existing human rights
regime. I begin by describing coercion and persuasion, the two major
categories of strategies for improving compliance, and show how both
are focused on altering a state's expected utility calculation. I then
discuss the extent to which these strategies have succeeded. The dis-
cussion in this Article applies only to the extent that states have an
interest in complying with at least some human rights norms. Of
course, that condition will be satisfied more often for some states
than others, and suboptimality concerns may be of limited relevance
to changing the practices of the most repressive regimes. As we will
see, however, even repressive regimes may have instrumental rea-
sons to comply in some instances, and thus even their failures to
comply could be suboptimal rather than utility-maximizing behavior.
Both coercion and persuasion are attempts to alter a state's ex-
pected utility calculation and in that sense work within the rational
actor model. The core premise of the rational actor model is that ac-
tors seek to maximize their expected utility. This means that they
evaluate the costs and benefits of competing options and choose the
course that will yield them the most benefit for the least cost. 14 In the
context of international relations, a rational actor model would typi-
cally apply a simplifying assumption that treats the state (or the
state's leaders) as a unitary actor.15 A state's utility is a function of
its interests and preferences, which are typically material in nature,
such as wealth and security, but could also be moral in nature, such
14. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1063. As Korobkin and Ulen explain, there are
other variants of rationalist theory that make more or fewer foundational assumptions. See
id. at 1060-66. I focus on what they call the expected utility variant for the sake of simplici-
ty but would note that none of the other versions of the theory would account for the subop-
timality concerns raised here. See id. at 1066-70 (explaining why the various versions of
rationalist theory are either inadequate or implausible or both).
15. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
(2005). Rationalist theorists do not deny that states are composed of diverse individuals
with varying interests but conclude that the simplifying assumption does not sacrifice ex-
planatory power. Id.
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as human rights. A decision is understood to be utility maximizing
and therefore rational if it yields more expected net benefits (that is,
expected benefits minus expected costs) in relation to the state's in-
terests and preferences than any other option.
16
Coercion strategies attempt to alter a state's expected utility cal-
culation by introducing additional costs or benefits. For example, if
country X would like to influence country Y to improve compliance
with a particular norm, country X could threaten sanctions for con-
tinued violations or offer additional aid for demonstrated improve-
ments. NGOs may similarly try to change country Ys behavior by
shaming its leaders and thereby adding reputation costs to the
equation.17 In this scenario, it is irrelevant whether country Y plac-
es any independent weight on human rights. Coercion strategies
may succeed by incentivizing compliance from a purely instrumen-
tal perspective. 
18
Persuasion strategies, by contrast, seek to alter the underlying
preferences of a state's leaders. The objective is for "[p]ersuaded ac-
tors [to] 'internalize' new norms and rules of appropriate behavior
and redefine their interests and identities accordingly."1 9 Leaders of
other states, as well as members of the broader human rights com-
munity, may attempt to persuade a country's leaders that a particu-
lar norm is worthy of respect. This can involve linking that norm to
other values the country's leaders already hold or using information
to attempt to debunk previously held beliefs.
20
Coercion and persuasion can potentially work together in a com-
plementary fashion, each reinforcing the other (though this will not
necessarily be so).21 Each also has sufficiently serious limitations that
16. The focus is on expected utility, which means that outcomes have to be discounted
based on the probability they will occur, because we are asking whether decisions were
rational at the time they were made. Thus, a decision could be rational even if it turned
out, after the fact, that a different one would have been utility maximizing.
17. Some commentators classify shaming as a persuasion strategy. See, e.g., Thomas
Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into
Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS
AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 14 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds.,
1999) ("In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization often involve processes
such as shaming and denunciations .... "). I classify it as a coercion strategy here because,
although it may also contribute to persuasion, shaming can have the effect of improving
compliance without changing underlying preferences.
18. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 633-34.
19. Id. at 635.
20. See id. at 636-37 (distilling the persuasion literature into the two subcategories of
"framing" and "cuing").
21. See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (2013) (noting that the different mechanisms of




cause many observers to view the overall human rights regime with
skepticism. With coercion, the primary challenge is that states may
not value the rights of people in other states enough to invest sub-
stantial resources in their improvement.22 Moreover, even when a
group of states is willing to invest resources to improve human
rights, they face a collective action problem that may prevent them
from successfully cooperating to do so.
23
Persuasion strategies face a different hurdle. While there is no
shortage of actors with an interest in and willingness to persuade,
such advocacy rarely has an immediate impact. Even proponents of
persuasion strategies recognize that they are designed to work over a
long period of time through "an iterative process of discourse124 and a
"repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.125
Thus, even under the most favorable assumptions coercion and per-
suasion are likely to foster only limited and gradual improvements.
Despite the limits just described, it is important to emphasize that
the international human rights movement has achieved meaningful
progress. Since the modern movement began in 1948 with the adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nine major multi-
lateral conventions developed under the auspices of the United Na-
tions have entered into force,26 and every state in the world is a party
to at least one.27 Of course, a state's membership in a treaty regime
does not necessarily mean its leaders are genuinely committed to the
treaty's principles. Some states may join in the hopes of improving
their standing in the international community without any intention
of altering their conduct.28 But the fact that those states join for more
opportunistic reasons is at least evidence that other states do genu-
inely believe in the principles at stake and are willing to reward that
participation.
Evidence also supports the conclusion that some states are in fact
changing their practices to comply with treaty norms. In an exhaus-
tive empirical study, political scientist Beth Simmons finds correla-
22. See Posner, supra note 12, at 160.
23. See id. at 157-59.
24. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 25 (1995).
25. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1411 (1999).
26. See The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bod-
ies, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Corelnstruments.aspx (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015).
27. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform? Reflections on a
Single Unified UN Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 179 (2007).
28. Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
71, 119 (noting that some states may "ratify to obtain various material and nonmaterial bene-
fits (such as foreign aid or lower trade barriers) that follow from the act of ratification").
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tions between ratification of particular human rights conventions
and improved practices.29 For purposes of the present discussion, it is
irrelevant whether the treaties played a causal role. Even if Sim-
mons' findings reflect only a correlation,30 meaning that the states
that improved their practices were already predisposed to do so, the
significant point is that at least some states are endeavoring to im-
prove their human rights practices without apparent material incen-
tives to do so. These are the states that have been successfully "per-
suaded" at least as to a particular set of human rights norms.
For those states that lack such intrinsic motivation, the remaining
question is the extent to which material incentives exist to influence
their conduct. At a general level, the answer is discouraging. States
can join human rights treaties for the limited signaling value that
entails without expecting much in the way of enforcement against
them for failures to comply. Human rights violations take place rou-
tinely and in the open without triggering any meaningful response by
other states. Despite the International Criminal Court's call for an
end to impunity,3 2 leaders of authoritarian regimes commit atrocities
without apparent fear of retribution.
Notwithstanding this bleak overall picture, there is reason to
think that material incentives exist for individual states to improve
in particular areas. The United States, for example, has several stat-
utes that authorize sanctions against or the withholding of aid from
countries that have engaged in a pattern of serious human rights vio-
lations.3 Both the United States and European Union have preferen-
tial trade agreements with numerous countries requiring human
rights reforms by their trading partners, with the threat of with-
drawing economic cooperation as the penalty for noncompliance.
3 4
29. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 20 (2009). Simmons finds, for example, that "countries that have rati-
fied the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] are in fact likely to reduce
their interference with some civil liberties, such as free religious practice," and that "a
government that has committed itself to [the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women] is much more likely to improve educational opportunities for girls,
employment opportunities for women, and reproductive health care and autonomy for
women." Id.
30. Simmons herself concludes that the treaties she studied did in fact "contribute to a
political and social milieu in which these rights are more likely, on the whole, to be re-
spected," but she emphasizes that her theory is "probabilistic, not deterministic." Id. at 21.
31. See Helfer, supra note 28.
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 91.
33. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 31-48 (2001) (summarizing the statutes and describing instances in
which they have been invoked).
34. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTS
BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS 16-17, 33 (2009).
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Commentators have shown that these tools are not necessarily wield-
ed in a consistent, principled manner against all violators, but in-
stead are deployed when other geopolitical factors support their use.35
But regardless of the motives of the actors applying the coercion, the
significant point for present purposes is that there exist states in the
world that place little independent weight on human rights but have
instrumental reasons to comply with some norms.
The preceding discussion attempts to establish the modest conclu-
sion that at least some states have an interest in complying with at
least some human rights norms. Some may have moral preferences
for doing so, while others have only instrumental reasons. In either
case, it should be a priority for human rights advocates to ensure
that states that have an interest in complying actually do so. Given
the likelihood, discussed in the next Part, that state leaders make
suboptimal decisions in the human rights sphere as they do in other
contexts, it follows that violations are likely occurring that are not
utility-maximizing and could thus be prevented with tools other than
coercion and persuasion.
II. SUBOPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING
This Part begins with a Section on some basic issues of scope. I
then discuss three particular causes of suboptimal decision-making
before separately addressing research on group dynamics in decision-
making processes.
A. Issues of Scope
I begin this Section by elaborating the general concept of subopti-
mality in state decision-making, before more narrowly defining the
category of suboptimal decisions with which this Article is concerned.
I then address how suboptimality concerns arise in the context of
human rights decision-making in particular.
As far as individual actors are concerned, the basic concept of
suboptimality is simple: a decision is suboptimal if it fails to maxim-
ize the individual's expected utility.36 The matter becomes more com-
plicated, however, when applied to state action. A broad range of in-
dividuals, from high-level policymakers to low-level officers, have the
capacity to act on behalf of the state. These individuals have their
own interests that may or may not be aligned with the interests of
the state. Thus, the most obvious form of suboptimality, which has no
parallel in the context of individual actors, is when a single official
acts to serve her own interests in a way that fails to maximize the
35. See id. at 14-16.
36. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1069.
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state's expected utility. Similarly, because states have complex or-
ganizational structures in which authority and information are dis-
persed among a variety of actors, the combined result of a group of
decisions could be suboptimal even when all the individual actors in-
volved made decisions that were rational within their respective
spheres.3 7
While those concerns are undoubtedly important, and I return to
them briefly in Part IV.A, my focus here is more limited. For purpos-
es of this Article, I define suboptimal decisions as those made by
high-level officials that seek and fail to maximize the state's expected
utility. A couple of observations will help clarify this definition. First,
the definition excludes decisions made by individual officials seeking
to advance their own interests at the expense of the state's. Such ac-
tions are undoubtedly commonplace, but accounting for them would
create a degree of complexity that I could not address within the span
of these pages. Second, the focus is on high-level officials because
that is consistent with the international community's typical ap-
proach, which targets state leaders with reform efforts rather than
attempting to reach ground-level officers directly. The category of
human rights violations committed by rogue agents is therefore set
aside except o the extent that decisions made by state leaders actu-
ally contributed to the abuse.
As is evident from those two points, my definition retains some of
the rational actor model's foundational assumptions, namely that
there is such a thing as state interests and that state leaders do seek
to maximize utility in relation to them. Regarding the former prem-
ise, I do not offer here a particular model for aggregating the inter-
ests and preferences of a domestic population into a discrete and
identifiable utility for the state as a whole. For present purposes all
that matters is that there is some meaningful concept of state utility
that exists apart from the narrower, self-serving interests of a specif-
ic leader or group of leaders and against which particular decisions
can be evaluated and determined to be rational or suboptimal. Re-
garding the latter premise, this is, as noted above, a necessary sim-
plifying assumption, but it nonetheless likely describes how many
state decisions are made. In other words, it is plausible to assume
that a state's leaders are at least sometimes attempting to maximize
the expected utility of their state, and the present analysis would be
relevant to at least that extent.
Turning to how suboptimality appears in the context of human
rights decision-making, two further clarifications are in order. First,
suboptimality concerns can arise at different stages in a course of ac-
tion. For example, state leaders in a planning stage could miscalcu-
37. See Note, supra note 11, at 1937-39.
[Vol. 42:645
HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION-MAKING
late which of their available options would maximize their state's
utility. In the country B scenario laid out in the Introduction, that
would mean failing to see that a conciliatory approach to the domes-
tic conflict would have higher net benefits than a retaliatory ap-
proach. Alternatively, state leaders may as an initial matter have
determined that compliance is desirable, whether for instrumental or
moral reasons, yet fail at the stage of execution to fulfill that objec-
tive. To illustrate using the country A scenario, A's leaders could
have made an optimal decision to protect speech and association
rights, but then go on to make suboptimal decisions that lead to hu-
man rights violations by providing inadequate training or allocating
insufficient resources to officers on the ground. As I will explain lat-
er, the stage at which errors arise may affect the response that hu-
man rights advocates opt to take, but the point for now is that deci-
sions at all stages may properly be deemed suboptimal.
Second, the universe of relevant decisions includes those that im-
plicate human rights both directly and indirectly. A direct human
rights decision is one for which human rights concerns are the pri-
mary focus. For example, a state may confront the question whether
to relax speech restrictions to provide greater rights to its citizens, or
vice versa. An indirect human rights decision is one that primarily
addresses some other strategic objective but also has human rights
consequences. For example, a state may decide to crack down on pub-
lic unrest primarily to serve the goal of improving social stability,
with unintended human rights violations occurring as a result. As
with the prior point, this distinction may have implications for how
the human rights community should respond, but for basic defini-
tional purposes it is sufficient to note that suboptimality concerns are
potentially relevant to both types of decisions.
B. Three Causes of Suboptimality
Decisions could be suboptimal as the result of a wide range of
causes, and all of them are at least potentially relevant to human
rights. I focus here on three lines of research on suboptimal decision-
making, chosen in part because they have been extensively explored
in the international relations literature and therefore can more readi-
ly be applied to human rights, and in part because they involve forces
that seem likely to push actors toward violations rather than compli-
ance.3 8 In each of the Subsections below, I will introduce one line of
research on a particular cause of suboptimality, with an emphasis on
38. In principle, suboptimal decision-making could be just as, or more likely, to drive
actors toward compliance. As elaborated below, the three causes on which I have chosen to
focus seem likely to exacerbate the types of risk-taking and power-seeking behavior that
often lead to human rights violations.
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how it has been used to analyze the decision-making of state leaders
in international relations scholarship.3 9 I will then discuss how that
research can be applied to understanding the causes of human rights
violations.
40
As noted at the outset of this Article, one of the challenges to this
project is that much of the research on departures from rationality
has focused on individuals and in particular how they behave in la-
boratory experiments. The difficulty of translating that research into
predictions about how state leaders in the real world will act likely
explains why its impact on international law scholarship has been
limited. While I cannot attempt to conclusively resolve this difficulty,
I will explore the most recent efforts in the international relations
literature to bridge this gap and thereby craft an argument for why
the research on suboptimal decision-making at least warrants closer
attention by international law scholars. I address one aspect of the
objection-whether experimental findings on individuals in laborato-
ries can meaningfully predict how state leaders, who are typically
experienced elites, will behave in the real world-within each of the
Subsections below. I address the second aspect of the objection-
whether the fact that state leaders often make decisions in groups
rather than as isolated individuals-in a separate Section at the end
of this Part.
1. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory was first introduced in 1979 by economists Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Its central tenet is that the value in-
dividuals place on an outcome varies depending on the reference
point.41 This tendency reflects a departure from rationality because
classical expected utility theory assumes that individuals have fixed
preferences that would not vary based on how choices are framed.
42
39. I will be briefer in my summary of the basic concepts because they have been dis-
cussed at length in numerous other law review articles. For detailed overviews of the major
findings of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology and their applications to law, see
generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4.
40. To preview the discussion below, after sketching in the main text how a particular
cause of suboptimality could contribute to human rights violations involving certain para-
digmatic scenarios, I provide in the footnotes some examples of such violations. My purpose
in providing these rough examples is only to show that the paradigmatic scenarios are
grounded in real cases, and not to contend that these specific instances necessarily in-
volved suboptimal decisions.
41. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Refer-
ence-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).




One concrete application of prospect theory is the phenomenon
known as loss aversion. Experimental research demonstrates that
individuals dislike losses relative to a preexisting status quo more
than they value identical gains.43 Because of this aversion, individu-
als may, for example, be willing to invest more to protect against a
prospective loss than to produce the corresponding potential gain.
44
A corollary of this finding addresses how loss aversion affects peo-
ple's preferences for risk. Specifically, when people are operating in
the realm or domain of gains, meaning that all outcomes are likely to
involve some form of gain, they will proceed with particular caution
to avoid losses. Conversely, when people are operating in the realm
or domain of losses, meaning that all outcomes are likely to include
some form of loss, they will engage in riskier behavior in the hopes of
obtaining an unlikely gain.45 Put more simply, individuals are more
likely to act cautiously if they are operating from a secure position,
while they are more likely to take risks if they are operating from a
desperate position.
46
Related to loss aversion is a phenomenon known as the status quo
bias, which describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the exist-
ing state of affairs more than expected utility theory would predict.
47
Loss aversion provides at least a partial explanation for this bias in
suggesting that individuals will overvalue the expected losses from
the change and undervalue the expected gains.48 As a result, they
may fail to make changes that would maximize their utility. An addi-
tional reason posited to explain the status quo bias is regret avoid-
ance, namely that people expect to feel greater regret when they suf-
fer negative consequences from action than when they suffer equiva-
lent consequences from inaction.49 To the extent regret avoidance is
at work, it would suggest that the status quo bias would be particu-
larly strong when the consequences of decisions are uncertain.
50
Loss aversion is one cognitive bias to which state leaders, or at
least experienced ones, may be less prone than the individuals who
43. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 41, at 1047.
44. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 42, at 72.
45. See id. at 71-72.
46. Rose McDermott & Jacek Kugler, Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theo-
ry Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm', January 1991, J.
STRATEGIC STUD., Sept. 2001, 49, 51.
47. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Deci-
sion Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (noting that experiments show individuals
disproportionately choose the status quo).
48. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 200.
49. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 657 (1998).
50. See id.; see also id. at 647-60 (discussing other explanations for the status quo bias).
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serve as the typical subjects of experimental research. As one group
of political scientists concludes from the experimental data,
"[e]xperience leads to more symmetrical decisionmaking."'5 1 Such re-
search suggests that applications of prospect theory to international
relations should proceed with caution, but not that they should be
aborted entirely. Indeed, the finding that experienced elites are less
prone to loss aversion has a useful takeaway-that the principles of
prospect theory should be taken particularly seriously when predict-
ing the behavior of young regimes and inexperienced leaders. Since a
significant subset of human rights violations may well be carried out
by such actors, these principles should not be overlooked.
Prospect theory has been one of the most influential behavioral
insights among those that have been applied to international rela-
tions. One basic proposition in the literature is that state leaders
"may be more concerned to prevent a decline in their [state's] reputa-
tion or credibility than to increase it by a comparable amount."
5 2
Since imposing reputation costs and conferring reputational benefits
are among the few effective tools that human rights advocates pos-
sess in persuading state leaders to alter their behavior, it is im-
portant to be aware that leaders are likely to have a stronger motiva-
tion to prevent losses than to achieve gains. Thus, to maximize their
influence, human rights advocates seeking to pressure a state's lead-
ers to take some action should attempt to identify concrete losses
that will follow from their failure to do so.
Another set of propositions in the international relations litera-
ture draws on the corollary noted above regarding the effect of loss
aversion on risk behavior. Jack Levy notes that "[a]fter suffering
losses (in territory, reputation, domestic political support, etc.), polit-
ical leaders have a tendency not to accommodate to those losses but
instead to take excessive risks to recover them."5 3 Moreover, excessive
risk taking does not depend on losses having actually taken place. It
may also follow when people perceive themselves as operating with-
51. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David G. Victor, The Cognitive Revolu-
tion and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 368, 370 (2013).
52. Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Pro-
spect Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 179, 187 (1996).
53. Jack S. Levy, Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations, 41
INT'L STUD. Q. 87, 93 (1997). Janice Gross Stein provides one real-world illustration of this
phenomenon. She argues that "President Sadat of Egypt ... never 'normalized' for the loss
of the Sinai to Israel in 1967," and therefore launched a war in 1973 in an effort to recap-
ture the Sinai despite Israels obvious military advantages. Janice Gross Stein, Psychologi-
cal Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior, in HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 195, 199 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Sim-
mons eds., 2d ed. 2012).
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in the realm of losses, such that they assume some form of loss is
forthcoming.
4
To illustrate this latter point, as well as to test their hypothesis
that novice leaders are more prone to loss aversion than experienced
elites, a group of political scientists examined how the George W.
Bush Administration dealt with two distinct crises involving North
Korea to determine whether its approach changed with the benefit of
more experience. In 2002, evidence emerged showing that North Ko-
rea had secretly explored a uranium enrichment program in violation
of prior treaty commitments.5 At that time, a significant proportion
of the President's key foreign policy advisers lacked crisis bargaining
experience and in particular experience with North Korea.56 And be-
cause of the recent 9/11 terrorist attacks and concerns about other
states at the time possessing weapons of mass destruction, it is likely
that interactions with North Korea were perceived as within the
realm of losses.7 In these circumstances, prospect theory would pre-
dict that the Bush Administration would take an overly aggressive,
risk-embracing stance.8 In fact, the Administration did adopt a con-
frontational stance, cutting off oil shipments that were due under an
earlier agreement.5 9 By contrast, four years later when the Admin-
istration had acquired more experience, its response to a similar cri-
sis in which North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon was more
measured.6 0 The Bush Administration may well have still been oper-
ating in the realm of losses, but its increased level of experience ena-
bled the team "to manage risks more symmetrically." 
6 1
It is important for the human rights community to understand
what leads to excessive risk taking because many human rights vio-
lations stem from desperate conduct by state leaders. Government
officials of a state that has suffered losses in territory to a regional
rival may undertake a risky strategy of escalating the conflict, creat-
ing opportunities for human rights abuses by both sides.6 2 Leaders of
54. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 374; cf. Levy, supra note 53, at 93
("State leaders take more risks to maintain their international positions, reputations, and
domestic political support than they do to enhance those positions.").
55. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 375.
56. Id.





62. Border conflicts are unfortunately all too commonplace. One that is particularly
noteworthy for the human rights concerns involved is the Bosnian War that followed the
breakup of Yugoslavia. See Damjan Panovski, Comment, Some War Crimes Are Not Better
Than Others: The Failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
to Prosecute War Crimes in Macedonia, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 623, 633-35 (2004).
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an authoritarian regime facing domestic uprisings and mounting in-
ternational pressure may take bold steps to reassert heir power or
else to establish a position of bargaining strength, resulting in high
civilian death tolls.6 13 And state leaders who have recently seen lives
lost in attacks by terrorists or rebel forces may take drastic measures
to restore security, leading to widespread infringement upon individ-
ual liberties.
6 4
In all of those scenarios, the fact that a risk was taken does not
necessarily mean it was the result of suboptimal decision-making.
Each of the hypothetical actions described could have served im-
portant strategic objectives of the state. The state leaders at issue
could thus have chosen their course without having been influenced
by loss aversion, based on a rational calculation of expected utility. In
any event, the important takeaway for the human rights community
is simply to recognize the possibility that loss aversion is at work be-
cause, as discussed in Part IV below, its presence or absence may af-
fect how the community chooses to respond.
2. Overconfidence
A broad range of social science research points to the conclusion
that human beings tend to be overconfident. Psychologists Shelley
Taylor and Jonathon Brown have identified three primary ways in
which people demonstrate overconfidence: "(a) They view themselves
in unrealistically positive terms; (b) they believe they have greater
control over environmental events than is actually the case; and
(c) they hold views of the future that are more rosy than base-rate
63. Examples of such behavior are not hard to find. Shortly before the Libyan dicta-
torship fell, commentators observed that Muammar Gaddafi was making desperation
moves from an increasingly vulnerable position. See David Williams, Gaddafi Fires Scud
Missile at Rebel Forces in Desperate New Tactic to Hang on to Power, DAILYMAIL.COM,
http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2026634/Gaddafi-fires-Scud-missile-rebe-forces-
desperate-new-tactic-hang-power.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2011, 2:08 AM). Likewise,
the recent use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad in Syria has been described as a
desperate attack launched because the regime was feeling cornered. See Nic Robertson,
Chemical Weapons: The Desperate Commander's Escape from Stalemate, CNN.CoM,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/07/world/syria-chemical-weapons/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2013,
12:11 PM). Of course, some have described the deal reached in the aftermath of that attack
as a victory for Assad, so the risk he took may well have been a rational one. See Shadi
Hamid, The U.S.-Russian Deal on Syria: A Victory for Assad, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 14,
2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/the-us-russian-
deal-on-syria-a-victory-for-assad/279680/.
64. The United States' response to the 9/11 attacks has been criticized on these
grounds. See, e.g., David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime, and National
Security Policy in a Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 206-07 (2008) (citing




data can justify."65 The evidence for the overconfidence bias starts with
extensive survey data showing that a majority of respondents believe
themselves to be better than average in some attribute or more likely
than average to succeed in some respect.66 And experiments confirm
that test subjects will in fact act consistently with their overconfidence,
as when they fail in mock negotiations to properly assess the strengths
and weaknesses of their respective positions.
67
Overconfidence may have an evolutionary basis. Dominic Johnson,
who is trained in both political science and evolutionary biology, ar-
gues that exaggerated confidence was an adaptive advantage in our
evolutionary past.68 Among other advantages, overconfidence may
have long-term benefits because "the costs of failure ... often matter
less than the missed opportunities arising from accuracy or overcau-
tiousness," and because "it can increase performance in conflict" by
"boost[ing] resolve and/or bluff[ing] the enemy into submission.."
69
Johnson explains that overconfidence in modern life is unlikely to be
adaptive in the evolutionary sense (i.e., in promoting reproductive
success) but probably remains an advantage in the sense that over-
confident people may in general be more likely to succeed.70
The flipside, of course, is that overconfidence leads to failed under-
takings that a rational actor might have chosen not to pursue.71
Moreover, the costs of such failures may be more extreme precisely
because the overconfident actor does not recognize pitfalls or is will-
ing to march resolutely into impending disaster.7 2 The negative ef-
fects of overconfidence are exacerbated by the related self-serving
bias, which refers to "the observation that actors often interpret in-
formation in ways that serve their interests or preconceived no-
tions."73 Thus, rather than being dissuaded from a course of action by
new data that would give rational actors pause, overconfident actors
may find a way to interpret that same information as confirming
their initial belief or choice.
In contrast to similar studies of prospect theory, experimental re-
search provides evidence that experienced elites overestimate their
65. Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisit-
ed: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21 (1994).
66. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1091.
67. See id. at 1093-94.
68. DOMINIC D. P. JOHNSON, OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR 6 (2004).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 16-17.
71. Roy F. Baumeister, The Optimal Margin of Illusion, 8 J. SOC. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 176, 177 (1989) ("[O]verestimating one's abilities and likelihood of success can
lead one into various undertakings that consume time and energy and produce failure.").
72. See JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 16.
73. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1093.
2015]
664 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
abilities even more so than inexperienced test subjects."4 Further,
Johnson makes a persuasive case that state leaders, as a particular
species of experienced elites, are especially likely to be prone to over-
confidence. In describing the characteristics of leading politicians, he
notes that "[t]he people who make it to the top of political hierarchies
tend to be those who have especially pronounced self-esteem, confi-
dence in their ability to change things, and optimism that they can
make a difference."75 Moreover, to obtain their high position they
must have "a character that can shoulder major burdens, accept nu-
merous setbacks, and withstand constant criticism, and yet still get
up every day believing they are right."7 6 Finally, having obtained
these positions, political leaders may be further buoyed by their new-
found power and a sense that they can achieve something great.77
The consequences of overconfidence in international affairs are
likely widespread and have been recognized as such. Johnson applies
the research on overconfidence to the issue of wartime decision-
making and examines several case studies to support the general hy-
pothesis that overconfidence increases the likelihood of war. He
demonstrates, for example, how both sides in World War I were not
only confident in their prospects for victory, but believed that victory
would come swiftly.7 8 Furthermore, he cites instances during the
course of that war in which attacks were launched with great opti-
mism only to end in disastrous defeats.7 9 While the mistaken judg-
ments on both the macro and micro levels are easiest to see in hind-
sight, commentators suggest that there was adequate information
available to make more appropriate evaluations of the risks-and
that some actors in the war did make such assessments contempora-
neously.80 Evidence shows that overconfident beliefs were prevalent
among political and military leaders as well as the citizens of the
states involved.
8 1
It is a small step to extrapolate from Johnson's analysis of war
decision-making by states and recognize how similar dynamics are
involved in human rights decision-making. At the planning stage,
state leaders must make the strategic calculation of whether the
benefits of a war will outweigh its costs. If overconfidence plagues
74. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 372.
75. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 24.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 25-26.
78. Id. at 59.
79. Id. at 77-79.
80. Id. at 78-79 (citing Jack Snyder, Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offen-
sive, 1914 and 1984, in MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
20, 20-21 (Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Stephen Van Evera eds., rev. ed. 1991)).
81. Id. at 65-66.
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that decision-making process, the state may enter a strategically un-
favorable war. Similar errors in calculation may result in human
rights conduct that fails to maximize the state's expected utility. The
range of strategic planning decisions that could implicate human
rights issues is quite broad. For example, a state's leaders could spe-
cifically choose not to comply with an established human rights norm
because they are unduly optimistic that the righteousness of their
course of conduct will be recognized by the international communi-
ty.82 In a different vein involving human rights concerns that are pre-
sented more indirectly, state leaders may hold overconfident atti-
tudes that blind them to the fact that a given course of action is likely
to have human rights implications at all, thus preventing them from
making the optimal calculation based on all the relevant inputs.83
Parallels can also be drawn at the operational evel or implementa-
tion stage. For example, military leaders at war need to make complex
decisions about the allocation of resources. Avoidable failures can oc-
cur if the leaders are overconfident in their calculation of the resources
needed to pursue a given strategy. Likewise, the improvement of hu-
man rights practices will often require the investment of resources,
and state officials could be overconfident about their ability to make
those improvements without that investment or with a less complete
investment.84 Therefore, human rights violations may result even
when a state's leaders believe compliance is in the state's interest be-
cause they fail to provide adequate training to, or resources needed by,
ground-level officials to meet international standards.
8 5
Another operational-level parallel can be drawn in the crisis deci-
sion-making that is required both during war and in the human
rights context. Johnson observes that overconfidence is likely to in-
82. China's leaders, for example, regularly justify their slow progress in implementing
human rights by arguing that developing countries require more leeway to deal with prob-
lems of social instability, but these justifications are widely criticized. See Randall
Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 71, 113-14 (2005).
83. Environmental regulations, such as efforts to combat climate change, have been
scrutinized for potential unanticipated human rights consequences. See Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, "First, Do No Harm": Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate Change, 38
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 593, 594-95 (2010).
84. To be clear, even when leaders have determined compliance to be in the state's
overall interest, each implementation decision requires its own expected utility calculation.
Although I highlight the failure to provide adequate resources as a potentially suboptimal
decision due to overconfidence, the decision could also be rational in a given instance if, for
example, those resources were needed to serve some other important state interest, or
simply because the benefits they would yield in terms of improved compliance do not out-
weigh the costs.
85. See, e.g., David Aronofsky & Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and Interna-
tional Human Rights: Does Europe Get it Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567, 594-96
(2009) (describing concern that U.S. immigration detention facilities do not meet interna-
tional human rights standards as a result of inadequate resources and training for staff).
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crease during times of danger.86 In war, overconfidence during such
moments of urgency may result not only in avoidable defeats, but
crippling or catastrophic losses. The stakes are similar in the human
rights context. During a crisis situation, such as widespread public
unrest, overconfident state leaders may improperly calculate the pos-
sibility of escalation and send unprepared officers into the fray who
then commit abuses even though compliance would have better
served the state's interests.
87
As in the prospect theory Section, it is important to emphasize
that for any given real-world scenario that follows one of the para-
digms described above, the actual state leaders involved could have
been making entirely rational calculations. The point to see, however,
is how overconfidence may operate in these general types of scenari-
os, because in the marginal case overconfidence could make the dif-
ference between violation and compliance.
3. Emotion-Based Decision-Making
That emotions play some role in human decision-making is well
understood. The difficulty lies in assessing whether that role should
be given any attention in models of human behavior, given its un-
wieldiness. One skeptical viewpoint would suggest that emotion is
irrational and therefore not subject to systematic explanation.
88
Without attempting to resolve those objections to the larger project of
incorporating emotions into models of human behavior, I will draw
on one particular strand of research that has previously been applied
to international relations, termed "emotion-based pattern recogni-
tion" by political scientist Stephen Peter Rosen.
89
In Rosen's account, human beings "can and do make decisions that
are the result of the comparison of alternative expected outcomes."90
This much is consistent with rational models of behavior. But when
operating under time pressure and addressing an issue in which they
have prior experience, people will view the situation through the lens
of those past experiences, drawing particularly on "remembered pat-
terns [that] were formed at a time of emotional arousal through
which the decision maker[s] lived."91 When time permits, a more con-
scious cognitive process can use subsequently obtained data to alter
86. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 46.
87. The recent crisis in Ukraine, for example, has been attributed to a public backlash
following overly severe government crackdowns on peaceful protesters. See "hy Is Ukraine
in Turmoil?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182823.
88. MCDERMOTT, supra note 42, at 169.





the emotion-based decision, but rational analysis may also play a
more secondary role by simply helping to select the course of action
that will best implement the earlier decision.92 In short, while not
rejecting the possibility and importance of rational analysis entirely,
this account supplements the rational model by explaining how hu-
man beings find the data points they deem relevant and reach an ul-
timate conclusion when it would simply be impossible to do a full
processing of all the available information that would potentially
bear on the decision.
Compared to the previously discussed causes of suboptimality, the
phenomenon of emotion-based decision-making has a stronger scien-
tific basis and does not depend primarily on observations of how ran-
dom individual subjects have behaved in laboratory settings. Neuro-
science research studying activity in the human brain during deci-
sion-making confirms that the cognitive processing of information
includes an emotional component.93 Given this firmer grounding,
there is less reason for concern that the research would not translate
to elite state leaders operating in real-world conditions, and the in-
ternational relations literature has not shown reluctance in taking
such a step.94
As Johnson did with overconfidence, Rosen applies the concept of
emotion-based pattern recognition to decision-making in war. One
case study used by Rosen examines the decision-making process of
John F. Kennedy and his administration during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. While a traditional account of that episode portrays the actors
as engaged in a "careful evaluation of alternative options, and a con-
scious search for information to illuminate those options," one histo-
rian's review of transcripts of meetings about the crisis emphasizes
the striking absence of any substantive debate about the military im-
portance of Soviet missiles being present in Cuba.95 In light of that
observation, Rosen advances the alternative explanation that Kenne-
dy's tough-minded response was formulated on the basis of negative
emotions, stemming from the negative reaction Kennedy had follow-
ing a Vienna summit meeting with Soviet premier Nikita Khrush-
chev, and from subsequent comments by the latter that likely left
Kennedy feeling the need to avoid the appearance of weakness.
96
Even assuming that a rational weighing of costs and benefits would
92. Id.
93. See id. at 32-35; see also Rose McDermott, The Feeling of Rationality: The Mean-
ing of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science, 2. PERSP. ON P(L. 691, 692-93 (2004).
94. Of course, future advances could show that experienced elites are l ss prone to be
influenced by emotions in their decision-making, but to my knowledge no research has
been done to test this question.
95. ROSEN, supra note 89, at 59, 61.
96. See id. at 63.
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have produced the same decision, the important point for present
purposes is that Kennedy's decision was, in fact, made quite early on,
before there would have been time to assess the relevant data.97
Thus, Rosen concludes that an account of the crisis that factors in
Kennedy's emotion-based decision-making is more persuasive.
9 8
How, then, might emotion-based pattern recognition apply to hu-
man rights decision-making? Perhaps the clearest example would
come from human rights violations that take place in the course of
longstanding conflicts between religious or ethnic groups. In scenari-
os in which one group holds power over a religious or ethnic minority,
for instance, the regime in power will inevitably view dealings with
the minority group through the lens of past interactions. In particu-
lar, to the extent the minority group has created threats to the major-
ity through protests, acts of terror, or legitimate warfare, those
traumatic moments form the emotionally resonant paradigms on
which state leaders will later draw.99 More generally, even when a
state does not have a troubling history with a single minority group
in particular, its leaders may draw on conflicts with other opposition
forces that have previously plagued the state.
As Rosen recognizes, emotion-based decision-making does not al-
ways produce suboptimal choices, but given the distorting effect it
has on the available data points, it is certain to produce some.1 00 And
the likelihood of suboptimal decision-making seems particularly high
in the context of human rights. When a minority group engages in
protests or other forms of organized activity, state leaders will gener-
ally not have a reservoir of memories involving peaceful resolutions
on which to draw. Thus, if the patterns they do recall typically in-
volve violent uprisings that ended only with harsh crackdowns, they
are likely to respond with excessive force or pass unduly restrictive
policies.
C. Group Dynamics
Having summarized the research on three causes of suboptimal
decision-making and provided an initial sketch of how they might
affect human rights compliance, I turn to the second methodological
concern I flagged above, namely that the behavioral research has fo-
cused on individual decision-makers and cannot readily be translated
97. See id. at 62. Rosen notes that Kennedy's first reaction to reports of missiles in
Cuba was to say angrily, "He [Khruschev] can't do that to me." Id. at 63 (alteration in orig-
inal) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See id. at 63-64.
99. Like conflicts over territory, such ethnic conflicts are all too commonplace. The
conflict between Turkey and its Kurdish population, discussed in Part II.B, is one of many
examples.
100. See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 69.
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to state conduct. The first step in addressing this methodological con-
cern is to recognize that decisions for a state must be made by indi-
vidual officials who are at least potentially susceptible to the causes
of suboptimality described above. As explained in Part II.A, I do con-
sider whether decisions are rational or suboptimal from the perspec-
tive of the state as a unitary entity, because a model that attempted
to incorporate the wide range of interests held by diverse individual
officials would be too unwieldy to produce any generalizable theory.
But I do not mean to suggest that states are directly subject to the
causes of suboptimality in any anthropomorphized sense. State deci-
sions are potentially suboptimal, if at all, because of errors made by
state leaders acting on behalf of the state.
Even accepting this initial caveat, one could further question
whether it makes sense to be concerned with individual biases when
decisions on behalf of a state are often made by groups rather than
individuals. If the group is sufficiently small, as will often be the case
in authoritarian regimes, this concern seems less important, as there
is less reason to think that the cognitive biases that affect individual
decision-making will be corrected in that setting. 101 Likewise, even if
decisions by state leaders are driven by a more diffuse group, such as
the broader domestic public, those decisions may nonetheless be
suboptimal if they represent the aggregation of cognitive errors
committed by that larger group of individuals. Other legal scholars
have made similar points. 102
Research on group dynamics lends further support to the likeli-
hood that individual cognitive biases will persist, and perhaps even
be magnified, in a collective decision-making process. International
relations theorists have drawn on the work of Irving Janis, the psy-
chologist who coined the term "groupthink," to describe how in-group
pressures drive individuals to coalesce around a group consensus
view.1°3 Groups with certain levels of cohesiveness tend to produce
suboptimal decisions because their members seek unanimity and as a
result are unable to evaluate information and consider alternative
101. See Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Uncondi-
tioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 124 (2009) ("When power is concentrated in the
hands of a small number of individuals, individual psychology is important.").
102. See id. ("If we assume that state behavior represents the distillation of the prefer-
ences of many constituencies, and that behavioral or decisional biases are common, then
the actions of states may well reflect those biases. Thus, even if state behavior is guided by
institutions, not individuals, state behavior may still be influenced by individual biases.");
see also Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty
Design, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 355 (2013) (noting that "even if state decision-makers have
no cognitive biases, their decision-making may nonetheless be affected by the real or per-
ceived cognitive biases of other actors," such as their "domestic audience").
103. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) (describing the dynamics
that lead groups to suppress individual dissent and apply pressures to conform in their
decision-making processes).
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options as effectively as they would have on individual bases.10 4
These conformist pressures also mean that dissenting views are like-
ly to be suppressed, further interfering with an effective group delib-
eration process.1 5 Groupthink theory thus finds that, even in the ab-
sence of cognitive biases, each individual's decision-making process
would be skewed. To the extent that individuals arrive with preexist-
ing biases, Janis's research would suggest that interactions within a
group setting likely reinforce the effect of those biases.
A related line of research on group polarization finds that, under
certain conditions, a group may make more extreme decisions than
any individual within it otherwise would have. This theory suggests
that "members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a
more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' prede-
liberation tendencies." 10 6 Like groupthink, group polarization is par-
tially explained by the absence of any effective counterarguments in
a deliberative process.1 7 But whereas groupthink further relies on
conformist tendencies as an explanation, group polarization draws on
social comparison theory, which suggests that individuals desiring to
preserve their self-image and reputation will shift their positions rel-
ative to that of the group.1 0 8 To illustrate the point with an example
that would be particularly relevant o prospect theory, one key exper-
imental finding known as the "risky shift" shows that groups of indi-
viduals already predisposed to prefer a risky course will settle on a
collective preference for even greater risk-taking.10 9
The research on both groupthink and group polarization contains
many qualifications and does not purport to explain all collective de-
cision-making processes.110 Moreover, other theories on group deci-
sion-making provide reasons to think that groups can-again, at
least under certain conditions-reduce the impact of individual cog-
nitive biases.1 The important point for present purposes is that
these qualifications and opposing lines of research do not cast doubt
104. Id. at 9.
105. See id. at 9-10.
106. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 74 (2000).
107. Id. at 89-90.
108. Id. at 88-89.
109. Id. at 86-87.
110. For summaries of the caveats recognized in each literature, see MCDERMOTT, su-
pra note 42, at 252-55, and Sunstein, supra note 106, at 90-96.
111. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 27-41 (2009) (ex-
plaining how groups are likely to make better decisions than individuals based on the for-
mer's superior ability to aggregate information, evolve over time, and deliberate with the
benefit of diverse perspectives); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmak-
ing in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-32 (2002) (citing experimental evi-
dence suggesting that groups sometimes make better decisions than individuals).
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on the basic proposition that some degree of suboptimal decision-
making afflicts groups. Thus, the goal for this project and others like
it is to be aware of limitations and make more modest claims using
the best available evidence on group decision-making in a narrowly
specified context. With that objective in mind, I turn now to address
the available evidence on the extent to which groups are affected by
the particular causes of suboptimality described above.
First, with respect to prospect theory, empirical research on the
behavior of firms provides reason to think that groups operating in
the real world may be subject to loss aversion.112 In a survey of the
empirical literature, economist Christoph Engel notes evidence that
firms engage in more risky behavior when they are performing below
their aspirational levels, or when their industries are performing
poorly relative to other industries.113 In other words, they take great-
er risks when they are operating in the realm of losses. There may be
differences between firms and states that caution against drawing
any definitive conclusions, but it is nonetheless useful to know as a
first step that there is evidence that groups, like individuals, may be
prone to loss aversion.
Second, with regard to overconfidence, there are reasons in princi-
ple to think that overconfidence will often be exacerbated in a group
setting. The tendencies that drive groupthink, which can result in
the reinforcement of a variety of biases, are especially likely to exac-
erbate overconfidence. Groupthink draws on such dynamics as "a
shared illusion of invulnerability," "an unquestioned belief in the
group's inherent morality," and the "stereotyping [of] out-groups as
too evil for negotiation or too weak to be a threat."114 These dynamics
relate closely to, and are thus likely to reinforce, the forces that con-
tribute to the overconfidence of individuals. All of that said, the em-
pirical evidence on how groups and individuals compare in their sus-
ceptibility to overconfidence is more mixed and has been shown to
depend on a variety of group characteristics.115
Finally, with regard to emotion-based decision-making, there is
less research to draw on in assessing whether suboptimality at the
individual level persists in groups. From a theoretical perspective,
although Rosen does not tackle this question directly, the implica-
112. Van Aaken, supra note 10, at 444 (citing Christoph Engel, The Behatiour of Cor-
porate Actors: How Much Can We Learn from the Experimental Literature?, 6 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 445, 445 (2010)).
113. Engel, supra note 112, at 450.
114. JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 21.
115. See generally Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals
and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) (finding that the relative degree of individual
and group bias depends on factors such as group size, the type of bias, the magnitude of
bias, initial individual judgment, and the decision-making process).
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tions of his argument would suggest that suboptimality is, at least in
many cases, and with respect to state decision-making specifically,
likely to persist. That is because the relevant patterns on which state
leaders draw in making policy decisions may often come from experi-
ences shared by an entire generation of the state's citizens.116 Rosen
refers to statistical studies "confirm[ing] that negative experiences of
the kind that could easily lead to severe negative emotional arousal
have reliably led nations to turn against the policies that led to the
negative emotions."1 17 One example from international relations spe-
cifically is that, in deciding whether to align or stay neutral in a big
war, small countries tended to draw more from their own experiences
than from the general experiences of small countries making align-
ment decisions in the past.118 This finding suggests that emotions
played some role because, while a systematic study of all similarly
situated states would have more empirical validity, a state's own ex-
perience would have more emotional resonance for its leaders.11 9
III. ILLUSTRATIONS
In this Part, I attempt to show how the various forms of subopti-
mal decision-making described above may have contributed to hu-
man rights violations in two real-world scenarios. It is difficult to
prove definitively that a given course of conduct was suboptimal. Any
such analysis requires making a number of assumptions about how a
state's leaders value particular costs and benefits, determining what
information was available at the time of decision, and calculating
probabilities of the range of possible outcomes. It is harder still to
prove that any particular cause of suboptimality contributed to a giv-
en decision, absent access to the internal thoughts of the relevant
decision -makers.
My more modest goal is simply to show that it is intuitively plau-
sible that the various causes of suboptimality were at work in the
scenarios below, and if not in those, then others like them. In doing
so, I acknowledge the possibility that the decisions involved were ac-
tually fully rational, and I do not attempt to prove that my alterna-
tive account is more persuasive. It will suffice for present purposes to
show that suboptimal decision-making in human rights compliance is
a realistic possibility and thus warrants greater attention.
116. See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 52.
117. Id. at 53; see also id. at 54 ("Quantitative studies of national behavior do seem to
support the hypothesis that massive social violence or trauma can generate shared emo-
tional experiences and memories, which can then determine state behavior.").
118. Id. at 53-54.




In April 2004, CBS aired the first photographs depicting the abuse
of Iraqi detainees by U.S. soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison on its maga-
zine show, 60 Minutes H.120 The photos were published two days later
on the New Yorker website along with a story by Seymour Hersh.
121
News of the abuse provoked outrage among American politicians as
well as members of the public. It likewise triggered protests and
threats of retaliation in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. This
Section argues that the Abu Ghraib scandal could plausibly have
been the result of suboptimal decision-making by the United States
and illustrates how some of the causes of suboptimality discussed in
the prior Part may have contributed to the events.
1. Background
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, and by August
2003 the war effort was going badly, with particular concerns about
the absence of useful intelligence causing frustration.122 Around that
time, President George W. Bush decided to send General Geoffrey
Miller, the commander in charge of Guanthnamo Bay, to review the
situation in the prisons of Iraq and provide recommendations. 123 The
thrust of General Miller's recommendation was that Iraqi prisons
should be transformed into interrogation centers in the mold of
Guantnamo. 
124
Within a few months, in January 2004, a major investigation into
widespread human rights violations was launched after a military
police officer turned over a disk containing photographs of abuse to
Army commanders.125 The resulting report was authored by Major
General Antonio Taguba and documented what he called "sadistic,
blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" in the Abu Ghraib prison be-
tween October and December of 2003.126 General Taguba cited the
following particular instances of abuse:
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on de-
tainees;
Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
120. See David Remnick, Introduction to SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND:
THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB ix, xviii (2004).
121. Id.
122. HERSH, supra note 120, at 20.
123. Id. at 20.
124. Id. at 31.
125. Id. at 25.
126. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16 (2004), available at https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf.
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Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
Threatening male detainees with rape;
Allowing a military police guard to stich the wound of a detainee
who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom
stick[;]
Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees
with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a de-
tainee. 127
General Taguba also noted the extensive use of sexual humiliation,
which was captured in some of the most offensive photos that were
later published. These included "[if]orcibly arranging detainees in var-
ious sexually explicit positions for photographing," "[if]orcing naked
male detainees to wear women's underwear," and "[if]orcing groups of
male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed
and videotaped." 
128
The abuse of detainees was primarily carried out by members of
the military police, who the report found had not received adequate
training in the treatment of prisoners of war, including in the re-
quirements established by the Geneva Conventions.129 Most of the
abuse described did not take place during actual interrogations; the
officers involved instead believed they were fulfilling the request of
military intelligence officers to "loosen" the detainees up for interro-
gations to be conducted later.130 General Taguba's report concluded
with a series of recommendations designed to improve the training
and oversight of military police officers and increase the involvement
of experts in international and operational law.13 1
A few months after the report was released internally within the
government, the New Yorker magazine obtained a copy, and the pho-
tos were published both on the magazine's website and in a televised
CBS news broadcast. Condemnations from the media came swiftly.
132
Public outrage was intense and widespread.133 Military leaders past
127. Id. at 17-18.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 16, 19-20.
130. Id. at 19.
131. See id. at 20-2 1.
132. See Laura Barandes, Note, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications of the
Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371, 376 & n.40 (2007) (collect-
ing editorials).
133. See, e.g., M. Angela Buenaventura, Torture in the Living Room, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 103, 114 (2007) (describing public reaction in the United States to the Abu
Ghraib scandal); see also David Paul Kuhn, Bush Ratings Fall Amid Iraq Woes, CBS NEWS
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and present were among the most vocal critics of the behavior.13 4
Elected officials demanded reforms and accountability.135 The con-
cern expressed among these various groups was that abusive
treatment of detainees was inconsistent with American values as
well as damaging to the United States' material interests in the for-
eign policy realm.
The evidence that the United States suffered such material harm
is compelling. The Abu Ghraib scandal ikely undermined the legiti-
macy of the war in Iraq while helping to attract recruits to the insur-
gency.136 The events also damaged the United States' broader inter-
ests in the Middle East by feeding into the propaganda of terrorist
leaders and otherwise exacerbating anti-American sentiment in the
(May 12, 2004, 6:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-ratings-fall-amid-iraq-woes
(citing a poll that found sixty percent of Americans believed that the abuse depicted in the
Abu Ghraib photos was very serious and seventy-seven percent believed it was not justi-
fied); New Poll: Majority of American Voters Want Next President o Restore and Protect
Civil Liberties; Seek a More Assertive Congress, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 4, 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/32084res20071004.html (finding that eighty percent of
Democrats, eighty-seven percent of Independents, and seventy-four percent of Republicans
who responded wanted to "make it clear that the policy of the United States is to oppose
torture and follow the Geneva Conventions").
134. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27,
2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/ (quoting reactions
from former Marine Lt. Col. Bill Cowan and Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, then-deputy direc-
tor of coalition operations in Iraq); cf. HERSH, supra note 120, at 3-4 (describing the con-
cerns of General John A. Gordon, then-deputy national security adviser for combatting
terrorism, following the CIA analyst's report in 2002). A view commonly expressed among
military commanders is that abusive treatment of detainees may endanger American sol-
diers who are captured in the course of a war. See Leung, supra; see also HERSH, supra note
120, at 71-72 (describing the concerns of Judge Advocate General officers).
135. See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 120, at 66-67. Hersh quotes Senator John Warner,
chairman of the Armed Services Committee as well as a former Marine and Secretary of
the Navy, as saying in his opening statement at the committee hearing, "There must be a
full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse of Iraqi detainees .... I think it is im-
portant to confront these problems swiftly, assuring that justice is done and take the cor-
rective action so that such abuses never happen again." Id. at 67. The outrage among the
public and elected officials probably had some concrete impact in the sense of voluntary
changes implemented by the executive branch, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective
Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255,
1282-83 (2006) (describing steps taken by the Army and Pentagon to address detention
conditions), but it did not result in accountability on the part of high-level officials or in
lasting legislative reforms to address future concerns, see HERSH, supra note 120, at 66-70
(describing the investigation conducted by the Senate Armed Forces Committee, which
began aggressively but was quickly scaled back); Stuart Streichler, The War Crimes Trial
That Never Was: An Inquiry into the War on Terrorism, the Laws of War, and Presidential
Accountability, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 959, 974 (2011) (noting that congressional hearings were
"toned down" after Republican colleagues threatened to strip Senator Warner of his chair-
manship of the Armed Services Committee); see also id. at 974-75 (noting that legislative
oversight of the prosecution of the war on terror did not increase significantly even after
Democrats took control of Congress after the 2006 election).
136. See Marcy Strauss, The Lessons ofAbu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1303-04 (2005).
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region.137 At the same time, the Abu Ghraib episode damaged the
United States' reputation among its allies, whose support the country
needs in prosecuting the war on terror. 13 8 As a Senate Armed Services
Committee study of detainee treatment concluded, "The fact that
America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our ability
to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, and
reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save lives." 139
2. Alternative Explanations
Despite the readily apparent harm caused by the Abu Ghraib epi-
sode to U.S. interests, it is possible to provide an account of the
events that relies solely on rational decision-making. Although hu-
man rights compliance is undoubtedly one component of U.S. inter-
ests, it is not an absolute one that trumps all other objectives. Thus,
the first point to emphasize is that even for a country that genuinely
values human rights compliance, decisions are not necessarily subop-
timal merely because they lead to human rights violations. In any
given decision, government leaders must balance the value of human
rights against other interests, such as national security, and could
make a rational determination to pursue such interests in a way that
will result in human rights costs. Accordingly, the weighing of hu-
man rights consequences discussed below should be understood to
include a moral as well as a material component, but the moral ele-
ment is subject to the same balancing as any other factor in the ex-
pected utility calculation.
Nor does the fact that the Abu Ghraib revelations provoked moral
outrage and triggered material harms necessarily mean that the de-
cision-making of government officials was suboptimal. We must con-
sider the question from the perspective of government officials at the
time they made the particular decisions that led to Abu Ghraib. One
account that would not require resorting to suboptimality explana-
137. See id. at 1304-05. Strauss quotes Bush advisor Karl Rove as stating "that it will
take a generation to repair the damage to America's image in the Middle East." Id. at 1304
(quoting Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu Ghraib, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2004, 12:00 PM),
http ://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/07/lessons-of-abu-ghraib/302980).
138. See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 818 (2007) (noting the "harsh
reaction of European states to the Abu Ghraib episode"); see also Richard B. Bild-
er & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689,
695 (2004) ("A nation's reputation for decency and respect for law is a vital national asset
that can strongly affect its influence and leadership. Unless U.S. foreign policy and actions
in the 'war on terror' are seen by its own citizens and other nations as legitimate and in
compliance with broadly accepted legal and moral standards, they may fail to gain domes-
tic and international support. There is little doubt that disclosure of abuses at Abu Ghraib
and elsewhere seriously damaged the United States' international standing.").
139. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xxv (Comm. Print 2008).
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tions is that the officers involved were simply rogue agents who acted
independently, meaning that no responsibility should be attributed to
state leaders in the first place. While that explanation is consistent
with the Bush Administration's view that the abuse was primarily
the result of individual misconduct,140 most outside observers have
attributed at least some responsibility to policies determined by ex-
ecutive branch officials.1 4 1 On this view, even if no direct orders were
ever issued from the highest levels, senior officials established the
conditions that made the abuse possible first, by authorizing the
expansion of coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib prison, and sec-
ond, by failing to provide adequate training and resources to officers
on the ground.
142
Starting from that premise, we can roughly sketch an expected
utility calculation for each of those decisions. Consider first the deci-
sion to expand coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib. While other
considerations could have entered the equation, the key tradeoff
would likely have been in maximizing the national security benefits
of obtaining useful intelligence while minimizing the human rights
costs (again, in material and moral terms) from potential abuses. The
determination that this balance was best achieved by expanding co-
ercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib could have been fully rational if
some combination of the following beliefs was reasonable in light of
the information available to the decision-makers: that authorizing
more coercive interrogations had a high likelihood of producing ac-
tionable intelligence; that most officers in charge of interrogations
could be trusted to stay within bounds; that even if some officers
crossed the line into clear violations of human rights, these violations
were unlikely to be revealed; and that if the violations were publicly
revealed, the international response would be relatively muted.
There are compelling reasons, however, to question whether each
of those beliefs was in fact reasonable. First, given the composition of
140. Testifying before Congress, Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen-
eral Richard Myers said that it was " 'the actions of a few' rogue MPs and the military-
intelligence personnel who egged them on." Mark Hosenball, Abu Ghraib and Beyond,
NEWSWEEK (May 16, 2004, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/abu-ghraib-and-beyond-
128393. Similarly, Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, the Army Inspector General,
testified that instances of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan were "not representative
of policy, doctrine or solider training. These abuses were unauthorized actions taken by a
few individuals, coupled with the failure of a few leaders to provide adequate monitoring,
supervision, and leadership." HERSH, supra note 120, at 69.
141. As Republican senator and Armed Services Committee member Lindsay Graham
said, "This is not a few bad apples. This is a system failure, a massive failure." Hosenball,
supra note 140.
142. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 46-49, 60-63; see also Keith Rohman, Diagnosing
and Analyzing Flawed Investigations: Abu Ghraib as a Case Study, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. 1, 10-11 (2009) (describing the systemic failures that led to the abuses at Abu
Ghraib).
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the prisoner population at Abu Ghraib, it is extremely unlikely that
even effective interrogations could have produced anything of val-
ue.143 Second, based on the United States' experience running the
prisons at Guanthnamo Bay, there were reasons to think that mili-
tary police officers could not be trusted to handle these sensitive re-
sponsibilities without running into human rights problems.144 Third,
although there had been no prior revelations of comparably serious,
specific abuses, the Bush Administration's interrogation program had
recently come under scrutiny by NGOs and the media, and at least
the possibility of leaks should have been foreseen.145 Fourth, given
the criticisms made by the human rights community of the Admin-
istration's interrogation program, the international outrage should
not have been surprising. 146 If one or more of these four points is cor-
rect, then the expected net benefits of expanding the coercive interro-
gation program to Abu Ghraib may well have been low and thus like-
ly not the optimal course of action.
Consider next the decisions that led to the allocation of resources
and amount of training received by officers at Abu Ghraib. The ex-
pected utility calculation here would simply require weighing the ex-
pected benefits to be gained from additional training and resources
against the expected costs of those changes. The expected benefits
would include improvements in human rights compliance as well as
in the effectiveness of intelligence gathering. The expected costs
would primarily include financial expenditures. 147 The best indication
that the Bush Administration's decision-making on resources and
training was suboptimal is that the recommended improvements
identified in subsequent investigations of the Abu Ghraib episode
were fairly basic ones that would not have required any great in-
vestment of resources.148 While there is no guarantee that these
measures would have prevented the events at Abu Ghraib, it is none-
theless informative that the recommended solutions for a problem
that turned out to be so costly were relatively modest in scope. Thus,
it seems plausible to say the expected net benefits of the Administra-
143. See TAGUBA, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that "the intelligence value of detainees
held at... Guantanamo.. . is different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu
Ghraib" because Iraqi criminals not suspected of terrorist ties constituted a significant
proportion of the latter population).
144. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 32.
145. See id. at 13-14.
146. See id.
147. The costs should also arguably include the lost value in intelligence gathering if
some amount of strategic ambiguity in the guidelines enabled officers to cross lines they
would not have crossed with additional training. I bracket that factor, however, because it
is difficult to quantify in even a rough sense.
148. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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tion's decisions in this area were low and, like the decision to expand
coercive interrogations to Abu Ghraib, not the optimal choice.
3. Causes of Suboptimality
Having attempted to show that Abu Ghraib was plausibly the
product of suboptimal decision-making by the United States, I now
turn to consider which of the various causes discussed in the prior
Part may have contributed to those decision-making defects.
The first likely contributing factor is loss aversion, and specifically
the fact that the United States was probably acting in the realm of
losses-and thus prone to take excessive risks-when it made certain
decisions to encourage increased reliance on coercive interrogations.
As has been commonly observed, it is difficult to imagine a true victo-
ry in the war on terror; the best possible outcome is to avoid one at-
tack, with the knowledge that others are being plotted. The roots of
the specific policies that permitted harsher techniques were, of
course, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Having failed to prevent the tragic
losses of that day, the Bush Administration was likely in desperation
mode for a significant period afterward.149 It is during such periods of
desperation that prospect theory predicts actors will take unwise
risks to avoid the apparent certainty of further losses. One such risk
may have been the Administration's decision to establish a special-
access program (SAP) that authorized the creation of secret interro-
gation centers and the use of harsher techniques in the aftermath of
9/11.150 Indeed, during this time, secret memoranda were circulated
that encouraged military leaders "to take greater risks" to change the
course of the war on terror.151
It is likely that the same dynamic led to the extension of the SAP
to Iraqi prisons. As noted above, the war effort was going poorly in
August 2003; and, more specifically, the Bush Administration was
concerned about failures to generate useful intelligence about the
growing insurgency.15 2 In addition to extending the SAP to Abu
Ghraib, the Administration invited General Miller, the Guanthnamo
commander, to assist in effecting a transition to a more Guanthnamo-
like prison model. Given all the concerns that were already circulat-
ing about Guanthnamo itself, it can probably be said, even without
the benefit of hindsight, that this was an excessively risky ploy.153 In
149. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 51, at 376.
150. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 16.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 20, 58-59.
153. One White House official who had supported reforming Guantnamo at the time
commented after the fact, "Why do I take a failed approach at Guantnamo and move it to
IraqT' Id. at 20; see also id. at 3-6 (describing efforts by General Gordon to reform prison
policies at Guantinamo).
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short, to the extent the Abu Ghraib scandal resulted from the dubi-
ous extension of policies encouraging coercive interrogations to the
prisons in Iraq, that decision can plausibly be explained as an exces-
sive risk taken during a time when the Bush Administration was op-
erating in the realm of losses.
The second likely contributing cause of suboptimal decision-
making is emotion-based pattern recognition. One piece of evidence
that this phenomenon was at work is the fact that U.S. officials were
so quick to assume that the solution to the problems posed by the
growing insurgency was to employ tactics used at Guanthnamo. Put-
ting aside whether the Guanthnamo model was flawed on its own
merits, the problem is that the issues raised in each setting were dis-
tinct. As General Taguba's report appropriately recognized, the use of
procedures developed for Guanthnamo was questionable because "the
intelligence value of detainees held at ... Guantanamo . . . is differ-
ent than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib."115 4 The
latter population included a significant number of common criminals
who were not suspected of terrorist ties.155 That General Taguba
spotted this disconnect before the scandal broke suggests that a more
objective analysis of the relevant information could have produced
that same conclusion before General Miller's recommendations were
adopted in late 2003. And during this same timeframe, the prison
was failing to address an issue that actually needed attention, name-
ly the creation of a system for processing detainees.156 Such reforms
were important not only to respect the rights of detainees, many of
whom had been arrested on dubious grounds,157 but also because they
would likely have made the collection of intelligence more efficient by
focusing interrogators on the correct targets.
Despite these facially apparent differences, General Miller, upon
his arrival at Abu Ghraib, made clear that he intended to "Gitmo-ize"
the prison. 158 In this vein, he is reported to have told the commanding
general at the time that prisoners should be treated "like dogs .... If
they ever get the idea that they're anything more than dogs, you've
lost control of your interrogation."'15 9 Such statements reveal that
General Miller was likely unable to see the situation he had been
brought in to review through anything other than the past lens he
had developed as commander in charge of Guanthnamo.
154. TAGUBA, supra note 126, at 8.
155. Id.; see also id. at 10 (noting that the highest-value detainees were held at a dif-
ferent complex).
156. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 13 (citing concerns raised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross).
157. See id. at 21.
158. See JANIS KARPINSKI WITH STEVEN STRASSER, ONE WOMAN'S ARMY 197 (2005).
159. Id. at 197-98.
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The third likely contributing cause of suboptimal decision-
making is overconfidence.160 While the prior two factors help explain
how the Administration came to expand coercive interrogation poll-
cies into Abu Ghraib, the factor of overconfidence helps explain how
failures in the implementation of that strategic decision contributed
to the abuses that took place. Simply put, once the decision was
made to expand the interrogation mission of Abu Ghraib prison, the
Administration probably underestimated the resources that were
required to gather intelligence in a manner consistent with human
rights norms.
The first mistake was to place General Janis Karpinski, a com-
mander who "had never run a prison system ... [and] had no train-
ing in handling prisoners," in charge of Abu Ghraib.16 1 She was
named commander in June 2003, was tasked with implementing the
changes recommended by General Miller beginning in August 2003,
and was relieved of her post in January 2004 after the concerns of
abuse had been discovered internally.16 2 All the investigations of the
Abu Ghraib episode recognized that leadership failure was one major
cause of the misconduct.163 Given her transparent lack of qualifica-
tions for this position, it seems likely that Administration officials
acted with overconfidence in placing and then leaving her in charge
of this sensitive mission.
164
Administration officials may have similarly failed to appreciate
the training, supervision, and guidelines that were required to im-
plement the policies they had adopted. After the SAP was expanded
into Iraq, the Administration believed it was beginning to obtain val-
uable intelligence. But it then likely erred in attempting to speed up
its work by employing military police officers who were not trained in
intelligence gathering to assist in the process.165 One former intelli-
gence official observed that hubris likely led Pentagon officials to cir-
160. At first blush, there might appear to be some tension between suggesting that
the Administration was operating in the realm of losses and arguing that the Admin-
istration was simultaneously overconfident. In other words, if the Administration felt
certain that every possible outcome would be some form of loss, in what sense could it
nonetheless have been overconfident? To avoid this tension, I have to distinguish be-
tween the decision to authorize coercive interrogations at Abu Ghraib, which was argua-
bly an excessively risky one made while the United States was operating in the realm of
losses, and operational decisions about how to implement that policy, which were argua-
bly tainted with overconfidence.
161. HERSH, supra note 120, at 21.
162. Id. at 21-22.
163. See Rohman, supra note 142, at 21, 25 n. 127.
164. One alternative explanation for this error may be simple carelessness. But care-
lessness and overconfidence are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is easy to see how they
could go together when overconfidence about one's prospects for success in a given area
leads one to pay it less attention.
165. See HERSH, supra note 120, at 60-61.
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cumvent the military planners who would have properly identified
the risks involved and recommended better controls.16 6 Ultimately, it
is telling that insiders at the time believed the Administration was
making poor implementation decisions, such as when the CIA decid-
ed to end its participation in Abu Ghraib interrogations. 167
In sum, once the decision to employ enhanced interrogation at
Abu Ghraib was made, the conditions were such that the likelihood of
abuses might have been high already. But however suboptimal that
first decision was, the failure to implement it with adequate re-
sources as a result of overconfidence likely compounded the problem.
B. Turkey's Kurdish Problem
Since 2004, Turkey has been a formal candidate for accession to
the European Union (EU). The official opening of this process was
seen as a landmark moment for Turkey, which had long sought EU
membership as a marker of acceptance among Western states. The
primary obstacle to Turkey's accession is Turkey's human rights rec-
ord, and foremost among the concerns of the EU members has been
Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish population. This Section contends
that at least some of the human rights violations Turkey has commit-
ted against its Kurdish population could plausibly have resulted from
suboptimal decision-making and, as in the previous Section, attempts
to illustrate how the causes of suboptimality discussed in the prior
Part may have contributed to those violations.
1. Background
The Kurds are an ethnic group consisting largely of Sunni Mus-
lims who live predominantly in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.168 In
Turkey, their population has been estimated at around fifteen million
and is concentrated in the southeast region where they constitute a
majority of the population in several provinces. 169 Prior to World War
I, the Kurds lived with relative autonomy under the Ottoman Em-
pire, but the end of the war and the division of the Empire split the
area occupied by the Kurds among the four states just noted.170 The
Treaty of S~vres, signed in 1920 to end the war between the Allied
powers and Ottoman Empire, had contemplated independence for the
Kurds as well as various other minority groups that lived under Ot-
166. See id. at 62.
167. See id.
168. KERIM YILDIZ & MARK MULLER, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKISH ACcESSION:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE KURDS 4-5 (2008).




toman rule.17 1 The terms of that treaty were quickly abandoned, how-
ever, as Turkish revolutionaries led by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk
waged a war of independence that ended in a superseding Treaty of
Lausanne, signed in 1923.172 That treaty established most of the
modern-day borders for the Republic of Turkey and provided neither
for Kurdish independence nor for any protections for the Kurds as a
minority group.17 3
Atatiurk went on to become Turkey's first president and helped
pass the new Turkish Constitution in 1924.174 Atatflrk's vision, em-
bodied in that document, was for Turkey to become "a unified, cen-
tralized and ethnically homogeneous state with a single Turkish
identity."17 5 To achieve this objective, Turkey would have to force the
assimilation of minority groups like the Kurds, and it proceeded to do
just that. From the very beginning of Turkey's existence, the gov-
ernment sought to eliminate non-Turkish identities, which in the
southeast region dominated by Kurds meant deploying a combination
of "restrictive legislation and state-sponsored violence."1716 The Kurds
attempted several uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s, which were met
with brutal retaliations.177
Such repressive measures continued in the decades following,
leading to the creation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
1978.178 The PKK launched a full-scale insurgency in 1984, lasting
until 1999, when the PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured
and the PKK declared a ceasefire.17 9 Between 1984 and 1999, more
than 37,000 people died, around 3500 villages were evacuated, and
nearly three million people were internally displaced.18 0 One author
describes the atmosphere during this period as follows:
State security forces targeted both the PKK and Kurdish rural
communities, and security operations in Kurdish villages were ac-
companied by arbitrary arrests, looting of moveable property, beat-
ings, torture and 'disappearances'. Few Kurds escaped the trauma
of the actions of state security forces. In detention, Kurds were fre-
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 13.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 14.
177. Id. at 15-16.
178. See MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS ASCENDING: THE EVOLVING SOLUTION TO
THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ AND TURKEY 6 (2d ed. 2011) (detailing the creation of the
PKK in Turkey).
179. YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 14-15.
180. Id. at 17; Hamit Bozarslan, Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: 1984-
1999, 3 HUM. RTS. REV. 45, 45 (2001).
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quently subject to ill-treatment, torture and extra-judicial execu-
tion, including falaka (beating the soles of the feet), electric shock
treatment and rape. This was facilitated by the relative ease with
which public authorities could subject Kurds to prolonged, incom-
municado detention and a climate of impunity among the police
and gendarmerie in which convictions for such acts were rare and
sentences light. 
181
During this time period, freedom of expression was significantly re-
stricted as the government continued its efforts to eradicate Kurdish
culture by, for example, banning Kurdish folk songs, Kurdish names,
and even use of the term "Kurdish." 182 Likewise, political parties that
put the rights of Kurds on their agendas were declared illegal, and
political leaders who supported such rights were imprisoned and in
some instances violently attacked. 
183
Following the 1999 ceasefire, several encouraging developments
took place. First, Ocalan used the stage of his trial for treason to ap-
peal for a democratic solution that would secure equal rights for
Kurds within the existing political structure, which marked a shift
from the PKK's original objective of establishing an independent
Kurdish state.184 Several prominent Turkish state officials, in turn,
began to express support for removing impediments to free speech
and cultural expression, emphasizing those that limited the rights of
Kurds.185 On the international level, the EU invited Turkey to apply
for membership, having rejected Turkey's application two years ear-
lier because of human rights concerns.186 The ceasefire lasted for sev-
eral years, but incidents of government persecution persisted during
that time, and no lasting solution was reached. 
187
Although the insurgency began anew in 2004, the EU nonetheless
decided in 2004 to begin the process of formal accession negotiations
with Turkey.188 That decision came after the EU's executive body, the
European Commission, issued its finding that Turkey had made ade-
quate progress in fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen Criteria to be
eligible to begin accession negotiations.189 The Copenhagen Criteria
181. YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 16.
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id. at 18.
184. GUNTER, supra note 178, at 67; see also id. at 65 (describing Ocalan's shift as be-
ginning in the early 1990s).
185. Id. at 63-64 (describing comments by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, chief justice of the
Turkish Constitutional Court, and Sami Selcuk, chiefjustice of the Turkish Supreme Court
of Appeals).
186. YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 15.
187. See id. at 18.
188. Id. at 18, 20.
189. Id. at 24.
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set forth the conditions for EU membership, including the following
political elements: "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minori-
ties."190 Commentators have expressed concerns as to whether the
EU's decision to begin accession negotiations was reached premature-
ly, noting that the European Commission's assessment might have
glossed over human rights concerns particularly regarding Kurdish
issues.1 91 But even skeptics agree that the opening of accession negoti-
ations meant a potential opportunity for the EU to place more effective
pressure on Turkey's continuing process of reforms in this area.
192
The hoped-for progress has been slow in forthcoming. The skepti-
cal commentators recognize that Turkey's initial response to the
opening of accession negotiations was to pass a broad series of legis-
lative reforms, but they question whether these enactments meaning-
fully changed the facts on the ground.193 Moreover, the process of re-
form has slowed down or seen setbacks in various respects. As noted
above, the PKK insurgency began again in 2004, which has meant
renewed acts of violent persecution by state officers.194 A new anti-
terrorism law adopted in 2006 has been criticized as overly broad and
vague, creating the possibility of extreme prosecutions for expressing
views that contradict official state ideology.1 Requests by EU offi-
cials that Turkey take the initial step of at least recognizing that the
Kurds are a distinct group with a distinct identity have been re-
buffed.196 A 2006 Progress Report by the European Commission cited
a continuing lack of progress in Turkey's willingness to "startH a dia-
logue on the situation of national minorities." 
197
In 2009, the government announced a "Democratic Opening" that
entailed a series of reforms designed to help improve the situation of
Kurds as well as other proposals to bring about peace.198 The result-
ing initiatives included a relaxation of restrictions on Kurdish-
190. Conditions for Membership, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
policy/conditions-membership/index en.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2014).
191. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 39.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 39-40.
194. See Comm'n of the European Communities, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, COM
(2006) 649 final, at 22 (Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Progress Report], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key-documents/2006/nov/tr sec 1390_en.pdf.
195. GUNTER, supra note 178, at 98-99.
196. See id. at 101 (noting that the military's highest ranking officer "refused to coun-
tenance the concept of the Kurds as a legally protected minority," and quoting him as say-
ing, " [a]pproaches based on race are a shame in this century' ").
197. 2006 Progress Report, supra note 194, at 20.
198. Int'l Crisis Grp. (ICG), Turkey: Ending the PKKInsurgency, Eur. Rep. No. 213, at
1, 6-7 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/turkey-
cyprus/turkey/2130%20Turkey%/o20-% 20Ending%/o20the%/020PKK%/o20lnsurgency.pdf
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language media and the granting of permission for the study of Kurd-
ish in public universities.19 9 Even as these reforms were being im-
plemented, however, the government continued to arrest Kurdish
politicians and activists.20 0 In 2009 and 2010, the government con-
victed 350 children, some as young as age twelve, and sentenced
them to serve in adult prisons for violating anti-terror laws because
they had attended a PKK demonstration.2 1 The most recently pub-
lished Progress Report in 2012 noted the lack of follow-up on the
Democratic Opening and continuing concerns about the prosecution
of Kurdish writers on terrorism charges without "a clear distinction
between the incitement to violence and the expression of nonviolent
ideas."
202
In April 2013, a new ceasefire between the PKK and Turkish gov-
ernment was announced, with both sides declaring an end to the
thirty-year conflict.203 The parties are now negotiating legal reforms.
As of this writing, the talks are ongoing.
20 4
2. Alternative Explanations
The starting point for assessing whether Turkey's handling of the
Kurdish problem is rational is to identify Turkey's actual interests in
the situation. In contrast to the United States, there is little evidence
to suggest that Turkey's leaders place independent value on human
rights compliance. Nonetheless, there are indications that these
leaders genuinely want to improve the human rights of Kurds in par-
ticular for instrumental reasons, namely to assist in Turkey's goal of
achieving EU accession and to reduce the costs of the conflict in lives
and resources.
Not too long ago, Turkish leaders denied that there was a "Kurd-
ish problem" at all that would require any special concern for the
Kurds as a minority group; instead, the issue was one of economic
199. Id. at 14-15.
200. Id. at i.
201. Yelena E. Archiyan, Turkey and the European Union: An Association in the Mak-
ing, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 117, 141-42 (2011).
202. European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, COM (2012) 600 final, at 22
(Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key-documents/
2012/package/tr rapport_ 2012_en.pdf.
203. See Constanze Letsch, Kurds Dare to Hope as PKK Fighters' Ceasefire with Turkey
Takes Hold, THE GUARDIAN (May 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
may/07/kurds-pkk-turkey-peace-talks.
204. See Ceylan Yeginsu, Renewing Call to End Turkey Conflict, Kurdish Rebel Leader
Hails 'New Era,' N.Y. TIMES (March 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
20 15/03/22/world/europe/renewing-call-to-end-turkey-conflict-kurdish-rebel-leaderhails-new
era.html? r-0 (describing the status of peace talks, including the parties' recent agreement
on a "10-point peace framework").
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development in the southeast region.20 5 However, by 2005 the Turk-
ish prime minister was finally willing to acknowledge that a Kurdish
problem existed, that the government had made "grave mistakes" in
the past, and that the solution required "more democracy.120 6 Shortly
afterward, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the current
ruling party that first entered power in 2002, began outreach efforts
to Kurdish communities in the lead-up to the Democratic Opening.
20 7
In 2009, the Turkish president recognized that the Kurdish issue was
not just a problem, but the primary challenge facing his government.
20 8
Apart from what the country stands to gain from EU accession, the
material benefits of resolving the Kurdish issue are apparent to the
government, as its own pamphlet on the Democratic Opening estimat-
ed that the internal conflict had cost Turkey $300 billion.
20 9
That Turkey seems genuinely committed to achieving EU acces-
sion appears equally clear. This objective may be based on reasons of
both economic gain and nationalistic pride. On the economic side,
although trade may not increase dramatically as the result of EU ac-
cession because Turkey already has free trade agreements in place,
commentators suggest there is potential gain to be had in the form of
attracting more foreign direct investment.210 The more abstract bene-
fit of nationalistic pride stems from the vision of Turkey's founder,
Ataturk, of achieving full integration into the West.2 11 Since that
time, Turkey has continued to pursue the goal of Westernization and
has sought membership in key organizations to validate and further
advance its progress. In the years leading up to the opening of EU
accession negotiations, Turkey joined such other European organiza-
tions as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, Council of Europe, Western European Union, and North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization.212 Membership in the EU would be the cap-
stone of this process.
213
205. GUNTER, supra note 178, at 88.
206. Id. at 91 (quoting statements by Recep Tayyip Erdogan) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
207. See ICG, supra note 198.
208. Id. at 1 n. 1 (quoting President Abdullah Gil as saying, "Whether you call it a ter-
ror problem, a south-eastern Anatolia problem or a Kurdish problem, this is the first ques-
tion for Turkey. It has to be solved.").
209. Id. at 6.
210. See Harry Flam, Economic Effects of Turkey's Membership on the European Union,
in TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 341, 351 (Bernard
M. Hoekman & Suibidey Togan eds., 2005).
211. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 13, 20.
212. Archiyan, supra note 201, at 117-18.
213. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 20 (describing EU membership "as an
important 'crossroads' for Turkey, marking a seminal point in her history and tying her
future firmly to Europe").
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The picture just painted is not without complication. There are
undoubtedly factions in Turkey that believe EU accession would be
contrary to their own interests or that have a different vision for
Turkey's future. Public opinion polls have varied but generally show
a majority of the population favoring EU accession.214 Moreover, it is
possible that some of Turkey's leaders oppose Kurdish reforms out of
fear that their own economic or political standing will suffer as a re-
sult, or that some are simply prejudiced against the group and do not
wish to see them succeed. While there is undoubtedly evidence that
such countervailing forces exist, any evidence that they actually out-
weigh pro-reform forces is more difficult to find. Instead, most com-
mentators agree that Turkey's leaders genuinely believe that solving
the Kurdish problem is in the state's interest but have simply been
unsuccessful in doing so.2 15 If that is correct, then the existence of in-
ternal forces opposed to reform does not alter the conclusion that the
state's interests are best understood to include a genuine commit-
ment to resolving the Kurdish issue.
The calculation might have come out differently a couple of dec-
ades ago when the PKK pursued a more explicitly separatist agenda.
Perhaps EU membership and a peaceful resolution would not have
been worth the price of altering Turkey's borders or sacrificing fun-
damental goals of national unity. But it is more difficult to see how
merely granting Kurds more legitimate status in Turkish society and
recognizing their need for certain protections as a minority group
would outweigh the value of domestic peace and the economic and
prestige gains that would flow from EU membership.
Although there is compelling evidence that solving the Kurdish
issue is, as a general matter, in Turkey's interest, the relevant ques-
tion for present purposes is whether particular decisions are rational
or suboptimal. Just as human rights compliance was only one com-
ponent of the United States' interests, so is solving the Kurdish prob-
lem only one component of Turkey's. Any given decision could fail to
maximize Turkey's chances in that single regard but nonetheless be
rational because it maximizes the state's overall utility, which takes
into account all of its interests.
Turkey's leaders are probably making a broad range of such deci-
sions every day. I will focus on policies restricting the basic cultural
and language rights of Kurds, as these are particularly difficult to
explain in solely rational terms. As described above, Turkey has in
place various policies forbidding Kurdish language instruction in
public schools and bans on cultural expression, such as Kurdish mu-
214. Gizem Arikan, Attitudes Towards the European Union in Turkey: The Role of Per-
ceived Threats and Benefits, PERCEPTIONS, Autumn 2012, at 81, 86-87.
215. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 20.
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sic. The expected utility calculation for these policies would primarily
involve balancing Turkey's interests in ensuring the security and
long-term viability of the state against its interests in successful
peace negotiations and potential EU accession. At least as compared
with other policies that more directly address security concerns aris-
ing from the Kurdish conflict, it is difficult to see how restrictions on
cultural and language rights would yield enough benefit to be worth
their substantial costs.
Even here, however, a rationalist account is possible. Turkey's
leaders could have rationally decided not to enact reforms in the area
of cultural and language rights if they reasonably determined, for
example, that concessions in this regard would likely encourage fur-
ther demands and incite greater unrest that would threaten state
security far more than the initial measures on their own would have.
On the other side of the equation, Turkey's leaders could have rea-
sonably determined that reforms in this area would have only limited
value because the Kurds are seeking a more radical change in their
situation or status, and that EU accession at this point is unrealistic
because of other political realities. If one or more of these premises is
correct, then Turkey's continued adherence to restrictions on Kurdish
language and culture could in fact be fully rational and not the result
of any suboptimal decision-making.
The assessment of neutral evaluators, however, casts significant
doubt on at least two of these premises. A 2011 report by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG) cites a belief among Kurds that "official
recognition of their right to their own language is the best way to end
deeply ingrained discrimination.1216 A former Interior Minister re-
sponsible for internal security affairs agreed with this view in an in-
terview provided for the report.217 Thus, there is reason to think that
reforms in language and cultural rights would in fact result in mean-
ingful progress toward a peaceful resolution. The ICG report goes on
to note that steps taken thus far to provide for greater linguistic
freedoms have not created any apparent problems for the state, and
it points to the fact that other states have managed to recognize lan-
guage rights without triggering problems among their minority popu-
lations.218 Thus, there is likewise reason to think that reforms would
not substantially undermine Turkey's security interests.
The one premise that is more difficult to evaluate is whether re-
forms in language and cultural rights would move the needle signifi-
216. ICG, supra note 198, at 11.
217. Id. The Interior Minister said that a famous Kurdish writer in Turkey, Yasar Ke-
mal, told him, "It's 90 per cent language. If you solve this it's mostly done." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
218. See id. at 11-12.
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cantly when it comes to EU accession. There is evidence to believe
that some EU members would oppose Turkey's accession regardless
of its progress on the Kurdish issue and on human rights more gen-
erally.219 Thus, Turkey's leaders may see little reason to move ahead
on this one issue while other obstacles remain insurmountable. But
the Kurdish issue is undoubtedly one obstacle to accession, even if
not the only one, and the continued use of repressive policies sends a
very visible signal to EU negotiators and member states that Turkey
is not acting with any urgency.220 Turkey's lack of progress gives
countries that oppose its accession a powerful talking point, even if it
is a pretextual one.
The bottom line, in any event, is that even if reforms in Kurdish
language and cultural rights would have only a small impact on Tur-
key's accession efforts, the other two factors do provide compelling
reasons to think that Turkey's current course is suboptimal.
3. Causes of Suboptimality
As before, having attempted to make the case that Turkey has
made some suboptimal decisions in its policies regarding the Kurdish
situation, I now turn to consider which of the various causes dis-
cussed in the prior Part may have contributed to those decision-
making defects.
The first that stands out is a likely bias in favor of the status quo.
As explained above, individuals are reluctant to pursue a change
from the status quo particularly when the consequences of that
change are uncertain. With regard to the Kurdish situation in Tur-
key, state leaders can undoubtedly be certain that the overall situa-
tion needs improvement, but they may fear any particular, concrete
change because they cannot be certain that it will not undermine the
government, much less that it will actually result in an improvement
over the status quo. Thus, they drag their feet on reforms even while
a violent conflict continues at great cost to Kurdish lives and Turkish
prosperity.
A second likely contributing factor is the phenomenon of emotion-
based pattern recognition. One recurring theme among commenta-
tors is that Turkish leaders fear that recognizing the Kurds as a dis-
tinct group will ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Turkish
state, a fear that is rooted in the history of the Ottoman Empire.
221
This means that the current leaders may be unable to avoid viewing
the conflict as one that requires suppression, even as they may be-
219. See Archiyan, supra note 201, at 144 n.211.
220. See ICG, supra note 198, at 12 & n.109 (describing "[1]anguage freedom" as a key
EU concern).
221. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 78.
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lieve on a rational level that negotiating for more equal rights will
lead to a more stable regime. In my discussion of emotion-based pat-
tern recognition above, I noted that the relevant patterns are most
often formed during emotionally resonant experiences through which
individuals actually lived. In this example, Turkey's current leaders
would not have lived through the destruction of the Ottoman Empire
themselves. Nonetheless, the overriding concern about preserving
Turkey's territorial integrity and national unity seems strong enough
to have been passed through generations of leaders, such that mod-
ern-day officials may feel it almost as strongly as did the founders.
Moreover, each generation of leaders has had its own struggle
with the Kurds to reinforce both the general lesson that national uni-
ty is of preeminent concern and that the Kurds pose the greatest
threat to that objective. Turkey's present leaders lived through the
emotionally traumatic experiences of the 1984-1999 PKK conflict.
The response that has worked to preserve Turkish unity time and
again has been one of repression. That may explain why, even as the
government has taken steps to promote particular reforms, it has
undermined its own efforts by responding reflexively to certain de-
velopments with violence or heightened restrictions.
The third possible contributing factor to suboptimal decision-
making by Turkey's leaders is overconfidence. The concern here
would be that state leaders are overly optimistic in their ability to
manage the Kurdish problem with minimal effort as well as in their
chances of attaining EU accession without more fundamental chang-
es in this area. Public statements by state officials have sometimes
betrayed this type of overconfidence.
222
It is likely that actions taken by the international or European
community have encouraged the overconfidence of Turkey's leaders.
For example, given concerns expressed by commentators about the
move being premature, the opening of the EU accession process itself
might have sent an unduly encouraging signal to Turkey that its
progress in human rights and on the Kurdish issue specifically was
adequate.223 The problem has continued with the inconsistent way in
which Turkish violations have been evaluated in the European
Commission's annual progress reports.224 Mixed messages from the
222. See, e.g., Abdullah Gul, Talking Turkey: A Conversation with Abdullah Gul,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/
talking-turkey (minimizing concerns about public protests); Jonathan Tepperman, Turkey's
Moment: A Conversation with Abdullah Gul, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2013),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/turkeys-moment ("We are forcing our
way through each door en route to full membership."). Of course, attempts to rely on public
statements should always be subject to the caveat hat they are a form of posturing and not
necessarily reflective of sincerely held beliefs.
223. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 18-19.
224. See id. at 173-74.
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international community exacerbate the problems associated with
overconfidence because they prevent state leaders from effectively
measuring their actual progress and instead encourage them to con-
tinue overestimating their ability to meet Turkey's objectives.
As I have emphasized, the two illustrations just provided are not
meant to conclusively prove that U.S. and Turkish leaders made
suboptimal decisions with respect to their handling of the Abu
Ghraib and Kurdish situations respectively. My goal instead was to
show that suboptimal decision-making could plausibly have been a
factor. Even if both of those scenarios can be explained fully by a ra-
tional account, each presented a close question, and suboptimal deci-
sion-making could make the difference on the margins in another,
similar scenario. Thus, the possibility of human rights violations re-
sulting from suboptimal decisions is substantial enough to warrant
asking how human rights advocates might adapt their strategies ac-
cordingly. I turn to that question next.
IV. BROADENING STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMPLIANCE
As described in Part I, the promotion of human rights is often di-
vided into the two categories of coercion strategies, which seek to
pressure state leaders into compliance, and persuasion strategies,
which seek to convince state leaders of the intrinsic value of human
rights. If all or nearly all human rights violations resulted from utili-
ty-maximizing decisions, then this two-pronged approach could be
seen as comprehensive. Under that assumption, the only options for
influencing state behavior would be to alter a state's expected utility
calculation either by introducing external material incentives, as co-
ercion seeks to do, or by changing a state's underlying preferences, as
persuasion seeks to do. But if a not insubstantial subset of violations
follow from decisions by state leaders that fail to maximize expected
utility, then there may be opportunities, currently being overlooked,
for improving human rights compliance within the state's existing
incentive structure. A broader strategy would look for ways to help
state leaders avoid these suboptimal decisions and thereby ensure
they are complying when compliance is already in the state's interest.
As I noted at the outset of this Article, developing a broadened
strategy is important because measures aimed at correcting subop-
timal decision-making could yield immediate gains while efforts in
coercion and persuasion are gradually proceeding. Moreover, the pro-
posals made here are generally consistent with, and potentially com-
plementary to, existing compliance strategies. That is because as the
human rights community succeeds in creating greater material in-
centives to comply and convincing state leaders of the validity of
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norms, it must also work to remove suboptimality barriers to ensure
that state leaders actually follow what would then be the utility-
maximizing course.
In the following Sections, I explore three measures that could be
used together to promote compliance that is already in a state's in-
terest. The first of these, diagnosis, is more of a preliminary step that
should be added to the process of human rights promotion before the
work of influencing behavior begins. The second measure of engage-
ment is already in the toolkit of human rights advocates, but I pro-
pose ways in which it should be reshaped to account for the general
problem of suboptimal decision-making. The third measure of debi-
asing moves from the general to the specific level to address the par-
ticular forms of suboptimality described in this Article.
In addition to human rights scholars, the primary audience for
these recommendations is the practitioners who work in NGOs and
experts who serve on monitoring bodies because they are the actors
who already have an ongoing influence on state behavior. The cur-
rent relationship between NGOs and monitoring bodies on the one
hand and state leaders on the other, however, may not be conducive
to the type of cooperation needed to effectively implement the pro-
posed measures. Accordingly, in Part IV.D, I describe what these ac-
tors may be able to learn from the successful relationships built by
the International Labor Organization (ILO), which has a monitoring
body that oversees compliance with international labor standards,
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an NGO-
like organization that monitors compliance with international hu-
manitarian law.
A. Diagnosis
The first step that should be added to the process of promoting
human rights compliance is diagnosing the cause of a state's viola-
tions. The importance of this step follows directly from the discussion
above, but it is not otherwise one on which the human rights com-
munity has focused. It is understandable why this step has been
overlooked, because the assumption has generally been that viola-
tions follow from utility-maximizing behavior, and the same two tools
of coercion and persuasion would be equally applicable (if not always
equally effective) in all instances. But his two-size-fits-all approach
makes less sense if the types of problems described in the preceding
Parts are also contributing to human rights violations.
A diagnostic process would therefore involve asking a series of
questions along the following lines. First, is the violation at issue bet-
ter explained as utility-maximizing or suboptimal conduct? Answer-
ing this question requires examining evidence of the state's interests
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and preferences regarding the issues at stake in the particular viola-
tion. For example, does the state involved appear to place independ-
ent value on human rights or the particular norm at issue, such that
a nonmaterial interest in compliance would likely enter its expected
utility calculation? What were the apparent material benefits to be
gained from violating and complying, respectively? If the analysis
points clearly to the conclusion that state leaders were rationally
pursuing state interests, then coercion and persuasion may be the
proper tools on which to focus because effecting change will require
altering the state's expected utility calculation.
But if the analysis suggests even the possibility of suboptimal de-
cision-making, the second question should be at what stage the deci-
sion-making went wrong.225 As noted earlier, suboptimality can
plague decisions beginning at a high-level planning stage and all the
way through various stages of implementation. Determining when
the overall decision-making process went awry would inform the type
of response that would be appropriate. For one thing, the posture of
state leaders is likely to be less cooperative if they made a conscious
decision to ignore a particular norm than if the leaders had them-
selves determined that compliance would maximize the state's utility
and had made miscalculations in attempting to implement that deci-
sion. The leaders in the former scenario would naturally feel self-
righteous or defensive about their decisions, whereas the leaders in
the latter scenario would be more likely to recognize a problem in
need of solving. I discuss further implications of this distinction for
possible intervention strategies in the following two Sections.
The final step in the diagnostic process is to determine what the
likely causes of suboptimality were. As alluded to in Part I, one possi-
ble cause would be unsanctioned conduct by a rogue agent that is not
fairly attributable to state leaders, and another would be self-serving
conduct by officials at any level. A further possibility also alluded to
earlier is one of organizational failure, in which some structural defect
prevents individuals who are otherwise acting rationally within their
respective spheres from reaching the optimal decision as a group.
These concerns are not the focus of the present discussion, but a com-
prehensive diagnostic process would certainly take them into account
because they point to different possible interventions. For present pur-
poses, the potentially relevant concern would be whether any decision-
making defects, such as the ones outlined in Part II, affected the state
leaders involved in the violation. If so, then one or more of the various
strategies discussed below may be appropriate.
225. Even a possibility of suboptimality should suffice because it will be difficult to




An obvious barrier to the success of a diagnostic process is the in-
formation to which the human rights community would have access.
To some extent, publicly available evidence in the form of statements
by state leaders and findings from state-appointed or independent
investigators would assist in the formation of plausible hypotheses,
along the lines of my analysis of the illustrations in Part III. But for
more definitive conclusions, human rights advocates would likely
need greater access to actual decision-makers, a point I address in
Part IV.D.
B. Engagement
A general strategy for reducing suboptimal decision-making would
involve greater engagement between state leaders and the human
rights community. Engagement has been recognized as an important
part of the traditional tool of persuasion but with a different empha-
sis. The literature on persuasion suggests that regular interactions
between state leaders and members of the human rights community
will gradually foster increasing acceptance among those leaders of
the importance and legitimacy of human rights norms.226 By contrast,
the focus of the present discussion is on improving compliance not
through the alteration of normative views, but through the clearing
away of obstacles in the decision-making process.
There are several ways in which engagement could help address
the causes of suboptimality. The most obvious is in facilitating the
exchange of information and best practices. Take the example of
state leaders who miscalculated in making a high-level decision to
violate a particular norm. One possible response would be simply to
provide additional information that could convince them that compli-
ance would actually maximize the state's utility. As noted above,
state leaders in this scenario might be prone to adopting an adversar-
ial approach in any dialogue with members of the human rights
community. Nonetheless, if concrete facts exist, or can be developed,
to show that a state stands to gain more by complying than by violat-
ing a norm, then convincing the state's leaders of what is already in
their interest should be more achievable than persuading them to
recalibrate their underlying preferences.
The primary value of this sort of information sharing is to help
state leaders solve existing problems. But a further value of engage-
ment is that it can potentially improve future decision-making so
226. See, e.g., HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 13, at 64 (describing persuasion as a "pro-
cess that spreads information about the global norms that protect human rights, stirs up
debate and interpretation of those norms, shames violators, and eventually teaches people
to value those ideas as part of the legitimate social order in which they live while embed-
ding those values in society's institutions").
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that state leaders can more effectively address problems that have
not yet arisen. The literature on cognitive biases finds that requiring
a decision-maker to justify decisions to a third party tends to produce
more rational thinking.227 If state leaders regularly engage with hu-
man rights advocates and experts about heir compliance decisions,
over time their reasoning process about such decisions should im-
prove, particularly as they anticipate having to justify such decisions
to third-party evaluators. Thus, engagement can have value not only
in actually changing the preferences of state leaders, and not only in
helping leaders make utility-maximizing decisions on existing human
rights problems, but also in counteracting the causes of suboptimality
on a broader and more forward-looking basis.
While the benefits of such engagement are compelling, it is clear
that the human rights community at present is not maximizing
them. Consider the current reporting system in which state repre-
sentatives provide a written submission detailing their compliance
record in regard to a particular human rights convention and appear
before a body of human rights experts to respond to questions and
concerns.228 Even setting aside the concerns raised by suboptimality
specifically, the reporting process has been extensively criticized. As
Professor Makau wa Mutua explains, "the [reporting] process is so
routine that in recent years both sides just seem to go through the
motions, even when the particular state in question is a serious viola-
tor.1229 Rosalyn Higgins, a former member of the Human Rights
Committee, which monitors compliance with the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights,230 suggests that states "seem main-
ly concerned now with 'treading water' during the dialogue, simply
with 'getting through' the two or three days of examination, so that
these matters can be shelved again for another few years."
2 31
These assessments suggest that the unique opportunities that
human rights monitoring bodies have to engage with state leaders
are not being used to their full potential. Two possibilities for improv-
ing the quality of this interaction come to mind. The first is prioriti-
zation. While undertaking a comprehensive evaluation has some
natural appeal, given constraints on time and resources, the forum
227. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1643-44 (2012).
228. See Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform? Reflections
on a Single Unified UN Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 175-77
(2007) (describing the reporting system).
229. Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for
De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 228 (1998).
230. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
231. Rosalyn Higgins, Commentary, Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee:
Some Thoughts upon Parting, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 570, 588 (1996).
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could be used more productively if the participants focused on areas
in which compliance may already be in the state's interest. Prioritiza-
tion would enable the participants to set aside issues on which the
two sides clearly disagree, which in addition to saving time would
also foster a more constructive exchange by avoiding a rehashing of
positions that could trigger unnecessarily adversarial attitudes.2 2 A
second step would be to place a greater emphasis on the importance
of follow-up, even if the response is just to express disagreement with
the monitoring body's viewpoint.233 Even the simple act of formulat-
ing a substantive response to a raised concern may increase the debi-
asing potential of the interaction by requiring state officials to en-
gage in some degree of rational reasoning.234 By contrast, canned or
general responses, including those that indicate a desire to comply
with recommendations, suggest that the officials responsible did not
give the matter serious thought.
A third, broader concern about the quality of engagement is the
level of trust that exists between state leaders and the advocates and
experts that make up the human rights community. I return to this
issue below in describing what members of NGOs and monitoring
bodies could learn from the examples of the ILO and ICRC.
C. Debiasing
Having considered how engagement can improve the general qual-
ity of decision-making, I turn now to more specific debiasing strate-
gies tailored to the three causes of suboptimality discussed above.
Where possible, I will incorporate examples that draw on the illustra-
tions developed in the preceding Part.
First, with regard to prospect theory concerns, human rights ad-
vocates and experts could place a greater emphasis on the costs of
human rights violations. State leaders may naturally view changes
that promote human rights as a form of loss. From a ruling class's
perspective, such reforms may be perceived as making concessions to
an opposition party or minority group or otherwise undermining the
stability of the state. And even if these costs are outweighed by the
benefits to be gained by prospective improvements, prospect theory
232. This suggestion should not be interpreted to imply that confrontation is never
appropriate. But in the absence of any power to sanction violations, monitoring bodies
should reserve the confrlontational approach for issues that have not already been flagged
with adequate visibility so that they can set an agenda for future debate, or perhaps for
issues where there is already mounting pressure on the state to change, so that there is a
legitimate chance of influencing behavior.
233. See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 738-40
(2013) (contrasting a response in which Thailand defended speech restrictions to the Hu-
man Rights Council with one in which Syria simply "affirmed its commitment to human
rights" and the review process).
234. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 227, at 1644.
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suggests that knowledge of such benefits may be insufficient to in-
centivize change, particularly when there is some degree of uncer-
tainty about that calculation. Turkey's experience with the Kurdish
problem illustrates the point: notwithstanding the evidence that
Turkey stands to gain more than it would lose from reform, state
leaders seem unable to overcome their bias in favor of the status quo.
If prospect theory is correct that actors are more motivated to act
by the fear of losses than the desire for gains, then the appropriate
strategy is to help state leaders better appreciate the costs of failing
to comply-in other words, to fight losses with losses. Depending on
the nature of the violations at issue, poor human rights performance
may lead to costs ranging from deterring foreign investment to exac-
erbating public unrest. Because the status quo bias leads states to
resolve uncertainty in favor of maintaining the current equilibrium,
outside assistance is needed to highlight the very real costs of inac-
tion. Scholars, NGOs, and other members of the human rights com-
munity can conduct such studies and indeed have done so before.
235
Developing these facts and presenting them to state leaders could
incentivize change in a way that appealing to the ideals of justice or
pointing to the prospect of material gains would not.
The human rights community can also help states overcome the
obstacles posed by the status quo bias by encouraging incremental
reforms. The idea here would be that state leaders may be more will-
ing to enact small-scale reforms that provide for an opportunity to
regularly reassess their effect and grow acclimated to a new status
quo, against which subsequent further reforms can be evaluated.
26
For Turkey, this emphasis on gradual measures would stand some-
what in tension with the recommendations of other commentators
who believe that only radical change will resolve the situation.
237
These writers are correct, to an extent: the arguably token measures
235. See, e.g., James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Cost of Shame: International Or-
ganizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators, 46 J. PEACE RES.
79 (2009) (finding statistical evidence that the World Bank reduced aid to states that had
been criticized in resolutions by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights). To
take one particularly straightforward example, the Ukrainian Ombudsman for human
rights calculated that the country paid more than $200 million in fines based on European
Court of Human Rights judgments between 2001 and 2013. See Nikolai Holmov, Putting a
Cost on Human Rights Violations Ukraine, ODESSA TALK (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.odessatalk.com/2013/10/putting-cost-human-rights-violations-ukraine/. One
judgment awarded seventeen prisoners on a hunger strike over detention conditions
435,000 Euro each; this amount was calculated to be "a combined cost probably greater
than improving the conditions they were held in sufficiently to prevent their hunger strike
in the first place." Id.
236. Cf. Steven L. Bray, Comment, Sealing the Conceptual Cracks in the SECs Envi-
ronmental Disclosure Rules: A Risk Communication Approach, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
655, 674 (1997) (making a similar argument regarding environmental reforms).
237. See YILDIZ & MULLER, supra note 168, at 178-83.
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that have been enacted thus far have hardly made a dent in the prob-
lem. But wholesale change is likely not politically feasible, even set-
ting aside the status quo bias. And the status quo bias helps us un-
derstand why seeking such wholesale change may well be counter-
productive. Instead, to address the concern that small-scale measures
will serve as mere token gestures, the focus of negotiations should be
on a comprehensive package accomplished through a series of man-
ageable steps, with conditions that must be fulfilled along the way
and plenty of time for reassessment.
Second, with regard to overconfidence, it is important for human
rights advocates and experts to translate strategic objectives into
concrete action plans and ultimately into operational steps with
benchmarks that allow for progress to be effectively measured. This
recommendation follows from the antecedent conditions Dominic
Johnson identifies for when overconfidence concerns are most likely
to be present. As relevant here, he explains that overconfidence is
likely to be more problematic (1) when the outcomes of policy choices
are difficult to verify;238 (2) in the context of broad, strategic decision-
making rather than in the context of narrow, ground-level issues;
239
and (3) during the implementation stage rather than during the de-
liberation stage, meaning that once a general course of action has
been decided upon, people think less realistically in figuring out how
they will pursue that course.
2 40
As discussed above, the high-level guidance and mixed messages
provided by the European Commission to Turkey illustrate the chal-
lenge. If they are to overcome the apparent effects of overconfidence
Turkey's leaders need to be provided with much more concrete rec-
ommendations about how to improve the human rights situation of
Kurds and, importantly, what benchmarks would constitute ade-
quate progress for the state to remain on track for EU accession.
Meanwhile, the experts who oversee compliance with human rights
conventions are already taking this approach to some extent; the rec-
ommendations provided in the "concluding observations" that wrap
up a reporting cycle are in some instances fairly targeted, including
suggestions for specific legislation. For example, in the concluding
observations of the Committee Against Torture in 2006, the first re-
porting date after the revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib, the rec-
ommendations included the enactment of "a federal crime of torture,
consistent with article 1 of the Convention," the proper registration of
all persons detained in any territory under the country's jurisdiction,
238. See JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 40.
239. See id. at 41.
240. See id. at 44-45.
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and the end to the practice of detaining prisoners in "any secret de-
tention facility under [the country's] de facto effective control.1
241
But given that, for many areas of human rights, there is a well-
documented gap between laws on the books and facts on the ground, it
is questionable whether recommendations for specific legislation will
be effective in most instances. The discussion of proposals for reform
may need to get still more granular. NGOs and monitoring bodies
could collect and provide best practices that have been developed by
other states facing similar issues. States in turn could be asked to
share plans for solving particular challenges complete with break-
downs of required resources and intermediate deliverables to measure
progress.242 The opportunity to receive third-party evaluations of such
plans, combined with the feedback provided by concrete progress
measures, may reduce the distorting effects of overconfidence.
Third, with regard to suboptimal emotion-based decisions, this
same shift toward greater emphasis on advance planning over re-
viewing past performance may also be beneficial. Here, again, it is
useful to recognize the circumstances in which emotion-based deci-
sion-making is most likely to short-circuit more rational analysis.
Rosen identifies three such circumstances. First, the time available
in which to make the decision will be short; second, the decision will
be one that triggers an emotional response; and third, there will be a
straightforward connection between the earlier event and the present
decision.241 In short, emotion-based decisions take place fast and in-
stinctively. Given that the impact of emotions on decision-making is
greatest when time is short, and there will be little if any time to in-
tervene just before a particular compliance decision is made, consult-
ing NGOs and monitoring bodies should devote time to identifying
potential crises and assisting state leaders with the preparation of an
action plan to minimize human rights consequences while there is
opportunity for more rational deliberation. Although the details of a
future crisis will not yet be discernible, its general contours can usu-
ally be predicted based on past events, and the human rights com-
munity can help devise plans of action using objective data points
that might go overlooked during the heat of a conflict. Preparing such
plans while there is time for rational analysis should at least temper
241. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commit-
tee Against Torture: United States of America, 36th Session, May 1-May 19, 2006, 13,
16, 17, U.N. Doc. 2006CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133838.pdf.
242. Of course, no state is likely to share such information when it comes to issues
relating to national security, but for other human rights concerns that do not touch on
matters quite as sensitive-for example, prison overcrowding or speedy trial concerns-it is
conceivable that states will be sufficiently forthcoming.
243. ROSEN, supra note 89, at 55.
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the role that emotions play in decisions made during a subsequent
crisis.
A further step that NGOs and monitoring bodies could take would
be to do more to identify and address the emotion-based patterns
that may underlie human rights misconduct. Recognizing that hu-
man rights decisions will never be entirely free of emotions, advo-
cates and experts can attempt to counter the problematic effect pro-
duced by the default patterns by offering alternative scripts. Leaders
should be reminded of crackdowns that escalated rather than ended a
conflict and of force deployments that resulted in tragic losses beyond
what anyone would have deemed acceptable. Because these alterna-
tive patterns would be presented in an artificial setting, they would
not have the same resonance as emotionally fraught moments
through which a state's leaders actually lived. Nonetheless, there is
reason to believe they can provide at least a partially countervailing
force against the patterns on which the leaders would otherwise in-
stinctively draw, if only because they should raise doubts in the lead-
ers' minds about the validity of their instinctive impressions.
In short, this approach would go beyond identifying steps that
should be taken to helping state leaders understand why their cur-
rent approach is flawed. With the example of language and cultural
rights for Turkish Kurds, for instance, it is not enough to tell Turkey
where and how it needs to improve, as the Human Rights Committee
has done already.244 There must be a dialogue about how the state's
past conflicts with the Kurds have colored the issue, as well as efforts
to increase awareness of other possible patterns so that Turkey's
leaders may see the problem more clearly and not through the lens of
those past conflicts.
D. Examples of Cooperation
Some of the proposals detailed above may be difficult to imagine
as realistic in the context of NGOs and monitoring bodies as they are
presently constituted. In particular, as alluded to above, the type of
dialogue and interaction described in the preceding Sections would
likely require a degree of trust between state leaders and members of
the human rights community that does not currently exist. One rea-
son that state leaders are instinctively adversarial rather than coop-
erative when dealing with the human rights community is that
244. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Turkey Adopted by the Committee at Its 106th Session, Oct. 15-Nov. 2, 2012, 9, U.N.
DOc. CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1 (2012), available at http://www.ccprcentre.org/doc/2012/
10/G1247598.pdf ("The State party should ensure that all persons belonging to ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities are effectively protected against any form of discrimination,
and can fully enjoy their rights. To this regard, the State party should consider withdraw-
ing its reservation with respect to article 27 of the Covenant.").
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members of the latter group rely heavily on the practice of naming
and shaming.2 45 Given how rare it is for more concrete sanctions to be
imposed on human rights violators, it is understandable that NGOs
and monitoring bodies resort to publicizing and criticizing violations
so that at least a reputational sanction can be imposed on noncom-
pliant states. While this can be an effective means of coercion, the
result is that few NGOs and no monitoring bodies likely have the sort
of cooperative relationship needed to implement the recommenda-
tions made above.
246
But by looking just beyond the core domain of human rights to
areas like international labor rights and international humanitarian
law, we can find two examples of organizations that have the types of
relationships with state officials that would permit robust engage-
ment and debiasing. I consider each of these organizations in turn,
highlighting the features that could be useful in informing how moni-
toring bodies and NGOs could build the types of trusting relation-
ships that would strengthen their ability to influence state leaders.
1. International Labor Organization
The ILO is a United Nations agency "devoted to promoting social
justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights.
'247
Like the monitoring bodies established by various human rights con-
ventions, the ILO has a Committee of Experts that meets to review
state compliance with various international labor standards. This
review process has been described as "the most sophisticated super-
visory system in international law.1
248
245. See Gopalan, supra note 138, at 793-94 (describing the practice of naming and
shaming).
246. As a caveat, I should note that my generalization about NGOs pertains to the
major organizations that have broad international influence, like Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International. There likely are smaller organizations, typically operating
within a single country, that rely less on naming and shaming and are able to achieve a
greater degree of cooperation with state leaders.
247. Mission and Objectives, INT'L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/mission-and-obj ectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited March 12, 2015).
248. Lee Swepston, The International Labour Organization's System of Human Rights
Protection, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT
91, 95 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003); see also Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Mon-
itoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 556
(1991) ("ILO mechanisms for collecting information, issuing reports and using publicity as
a means of encouraging state compliance, are the strongest in the United Nations sys-
tem.'). To be sure, the ILO is not considered to be an unqualified success, and some com-
mentators believe it needs sanctioning powers to achieve results with "recalcitrant states."
Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to En-
force Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 382 (1995). Nonethe-




One unique feature of the ILO review process that likely contrib-
utes to this success is its use of a phased approach. After a state
submits its report to the Committee of Experts, the Committee fol-
lows up on concerns by sending "direct requests" to governments,
"requesting further information, or pointing out discrepancies be-
tween a State's law and practice and the relevant convention.1
249
Such direct requests go straight to governments and are not pub-
lished except for a notation in the report.20 Furthermore, there is a
common practice to grant a "two-year grace period before the commit-
tee publicizes a failure to implement treaty obligations, to afford time
for the International Labor Office and the committee itself to work
with the country to bring it back into compliance.1
251
After review by the Committee of Experts, the ILO's Conference
Committee on Standards selects a set of serious cases for discussion
at the annual meeting.2 2 The Conference Committee includes about
two hundred members divided equally among government, employer,
and worker representatives.253 Government representatives appear
before the Conference Committee to explain their reasons for non-
compliance.2 4 The Conference Committee's eventual report includes
a "special list" of states that have failed to meet their obligations;
these states receive prior warning in the form of "special para-
graph[s]" notifying them that corrective action is warranted.
255
The ILO system's two-tiered approach could potentially pay divi-
dends for human rights monitoring bodies by providing them with
the access they need to diagnose the causes of noncompliance and
effectively pursue engagement and debiasing strategies. The idea of a
private initial review stage, combined with a grace period to allow for
time to address noncompliance, could dramatically alter the relation-
ship between human rights experts and state representatives. The
present dynamic has been criticized for "often [being] conducive to
political stands by government representatives.1256 But if the dialogue
began as a private one, and without the immediate threat of public
confrontation, the prospects for a constructive, open exchange would
seem significantly higher.
249. Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organ-
isation, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 580, 597 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
250. Id. at 598.
251. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 24, at 232.
252. Leary, supra note 249, at 598.
253. Id. at 599.
254. Barratt-Brown, supra note 248, at 558.
255. Id.
256. Leary, supra note 249, at 597. Although Leary expresses concern about the lack of
publicity for the Committee of Experts' work, this tradeoff is less concerning than it might
otherwise be because the next stage of review is public. See id. at 597-98.
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Interestingly, the ILO also retains the option to pursue a coercion
strategy in the form of reputation sanctions imposed by the Confer-
ence Committee. Given how I have emphasized that only a subset of
human rights violations result from suboptimal decision-making,
human rights monitoring bodies should likewise preserve this possi-
bility of altering a state's expected utility calculation. By clearly sep-
arating the cooperative from the coercive stage, this approach could
potentially yield the best of both worlds or, at a minimum, reduce the
distrust that would creep in if coercion were used in a less con-
strained way.
2. International Committee of the Red Cross
The ICRC is an independent organization registered as a private
association under Swiss law.257 Its mission is "to protect the lives and
dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence
and to provide them with assistance."258 While not technically an
NGO, it serves many of the same functions by promoting the devel-
opment of international humanitarian law, assisting individual vic-
tims, and working with governments to improve compliance.25 9 Com-
mentators recognize the ICRC as having a uniquely strong reputa-
tion for impartiality that enables it to obtain the cooperation of both
sides of an armed conflict.
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An important factor in the ICRC's ability to work cooperatively
with state officials is its promise of confidentiality for detected viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. The process begins when
ICRC representatives are invited to meet with detainees held by a
state (or non-state armed group), typically because both sides have
agreed to such visits. 26 1 After gathering information, the ICRC, ra-
ther than broadcasting violations, communicates directly and confi-
dentially with state and armed-group leaders to identify concerns
and provide recommended solutions.26 2 Like the ILO, the ICRC also
uses a phased approach. If the ICRC determines that its concerns
257. Steven R. Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion,
and the Laws of War, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 459, 463 (2011).
258. The ICRCs Mandate and Mission, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission (last visited March 12, 2015).
259. See The ICRCs Mandate and Mission: 29-10-2010 Overview, INT'L COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/Who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-
mission.htm (last visited March 12, 2015).
260. See Ratner, supra note 257, at 463; see also Leah M. Nicholls, Note, The Humani-
tarian Monarchy Legislates: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Its 161
Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223,
227-30 (2006) (describing the ICRC's reputation and ability to obtain cooperation but not-
ing criticisms of its work).
261. See Posner, supra note 12, at 165.
262. See Ratner, supra note 257, at 468-70.
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have not been adequately addressed, it turns next to seeking assis-
tance from other actors that may have influence on the target state
or armed group and ultimately to public condemnation.
26 3
The lessons of the ICRC example for human rights NGOs essen-
tially parallel those of the ILO example for human rights monitoring
bodies. In short, the goal would be for human rights NGOs to develop
the type of trusting relationship with state leaders that would pro-
vide the former with the access they need to diagnose the causes of
noncompliance and work constructively to overcome suboptimality
concerns. This could take the form of a phased approach in which any
coercion strategies are reserved only as a fallback if cooperation fails.
Alternatively, because there is no reason why any given NGO needs
to undertake both roles, it may be valuable for some NGOs to special-
ize exclusively in cooperative strategies, which should foster an even
greater degree of trust than any single NGO adopting a phased ap-
proach could.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to show how at least some human
rights violations likely result from suboptimal decision-making, and
it contends that the human rights community should therefore give
greater attention to the causes of suboptimality in designing strate-
gies to improve compliance. Although efforts to alter a state's ex-
pected utility calculation through coercion and persuasion remain
important pieces of the puzzle, this Article highlights the opportuni-
ties available to make more immediate gains. In short, by addressing
suboptimality concerns directly, the human rights community can
help clear the way for states to comply with norms when doing so
would already be the rational choice.
263. See id. at 470.
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